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Abstract
Intellectual Property is an ideology of the late Twentieth Century which reserves property–
like rights in information, so that creators may extract its economic value. Current American
copyright law draws mainly from this concept; it has been constructed through history by
negotiation between various established economic interests. Information Freedom is a competing
ideology which has been successful in the software community. It emphasizes the dangers of
over–propertization and the benefits of freely accessible resources, especially non–depletable
information resources.
Compromise must be reached in a practical (non–ideological) fashion in order to achieve the
social goals of: production of creative content (encouraged by fair but not excessive
compensation for creators); promotion of scientific, political, technical, artistic, cultural, and
economic progress by removing obstacles to accessing content and taking advantage of
innovations which change the status quo; protection of creative freedom; and ensuring quality
and diversity in the content which is created. Civil disobedience as a means to achieve these
goals may be counterproductive if it results in tighter technological restrictions on content
availability or stricter legal mechanisms; legal reforms proposed by Lawrence Lessig and Jessica
Litman are unlikely to be enacted.
Internet–based technologies have strong potential to increase exposure to diversity, decrease
costs, and improve the subjective experience for music consumers. Cheaper film–making
equipment may have similar positive effects for motion pictures to a lesser degree. Internet
bandwidth and other practical limitations suggest that immediate changes in video distribution
and consumption patterns are more likely to be driven by the availability of Digital Video
Recorders, or perhaps competing Video On Demand services.
Different economic models which fund content creation may be appropriate for different
applications, and may in some cases further social goals better than strong propertization.
Alternative models include voluntary contributions (either from creators or consumers); indirect
benefit by establishing reputation, selling related services, cross–promotion, or selling
advertising; and public funding. The history of telecommunication, including the telegraph,
radio, television, and the Internet, provides evidence that important uses for new technology may
not be initially obvious, that the maturation of digital information technology and related
economic models is just beginning.
Thesis Supervisor: David I. Kaiser, Leo Marx Career Development Assistant Professor of
the History and Culture of Science
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1 Introduction
With all the passion I can summon I tell this Committee that if Copyright is
allowed to decay, then this nation will begin the slow undoing of an immense
economic asset, which will squander our creative future.... Who will invest the
huge amounts of private risk capital in the production of films if this creative
property cannot be protected from theft? In such a scenario, the ultimate loser will
be the consumer.
— Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion Picture Assoc. of America1
Through the passage of the DMCA we have criminalized speech and scientific
research about the structure of computer programs as well as other simple acts
such as reading of books and other media.... These provisions drop an Iron
Curtain on the United States of America.
— The “Free Speech, Free Skylarov” petition2
Arguably, the concerns of people like Mr. Valenti prompted the United States Congress to
pass the landmark Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998. In opposition to the
continuing trend represented by this legislation, over 12,000 people have reportedly signed the
Web–based petition which is excerpted above, including a number of notable business and
political leaders in the open source software community. They blame what they see as the legal
and economic erosion of personal freedoms in this country on the corrupting influence of mega–
corporations like the major motion picture studios.
Though the collision of new technology and law is nothing new, the details of this particular
debate are unique to this time.3 Both sides have the gravest of concerns regarding the future of
intellectual and creative discourse in this country. Should the average citizen be concerned? Will
democratic forces successfully buffer the power of corporate hegemonies? Or will profit–seeking
entrepreneurs combine new technology and government regulation to all but eliminate long–held
values and personal freedoms? Or will everything eventually work out right on its own?
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This thesis chronicles several related stories in an attempt to discover how and where societal
forces are driving law, business, technology, and culture. In the next two chapters, I will
highlight important developments in the politics of copyright and the technology of mass
communication over the past one hundred years. Chapters 4 and 5 will present case studies of
recent collisions of digital technology and copyright law. Finally, I will leave you with some
thoughts about the future of these industries, in light of the theoretical and historical lessons I
hope to teach along the way.
Approach
There is always a well–known solution to every human problem — neat,
plausible, and wrong.
— H.L. Mencken4
You may have already noticed that I have started harping on four different themes:
government, economics, society, and technology. Law professor and author Lawrence Lessig
identifies roughly these as the four “modalities” which regulate individual behavior.5,6 To be
more precise, Lessig uses the terms “law,” “market,” “norms,” and “architecture.” Smoking is a
classic example used to explain this theory.
The first two modalities are easy to grasp — a given person might be dissuaded from
smoking by a law or regulation (backed up by the traditional threat of arrest, imprisonment, or
fines), or by the cost (backed up by law enforcement) of purchasing cigarettes. A “normative”
deterrent would be something like a social stigma against smoking. By “architecture,” Lessig
means the unavoidable “facts of life” we must cope with when dealing with any technological or
natural artifact or system. For example, it might be prohibitively difficult to force a cigarette
vending machine to dispense its wares without inserting the proper coinage. Lessig also uses the
word “code” to describe these architectural hindrances, appropriately reminiscent of both legal
“codes” and the sort of “codes” that one uses to program a computer.
It is important to realize that while these modalities might theoretically be described as
separate entities, in fact they are usually highly interdependent. For example, a law might be
passed which raises the cost of cigarettes. The government might provide funding for public
service announcements which attempt to convince people that smoking is bad for their health
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(altering social norms). A different law might mandate that vending machines be specially
constructed to deny service to anyone who cannot produce proof of sufficient age. Of course, the
government is not the only first mover in this system. The allure of easy profits may spur the
tobacco industry to lobby the government not to regulate the product — just as changing social
norms might favor tightening the law. Whatever it might try to do, the government is in some
ways constrained by the artificial realities of vending machines, ventilation systems, and building
design, as well as the less malleable laws determining the behavior of hot gases.
Applying the lessons of this theory to the general problem of explaining technological
change, it should quickly become apparent that all four modalities have roles to play. Even
though in a given situation, one or more may turn out to be not terribly important, it is necessary
to at least consider each one in turn. In the long run, and in the big picture, all four are always
important.7
Social systems are complicated creatures, not easily prone to simple dissection. As such, I
would warn against constructing the four modalities in a rigid fashion. It might be important in
some cases to consider artificial “architecture” separately from natural, or to distinguish between
individual psychology and group culture. Military and academic institutions are often
appropriately set apart from the general functions of governance and commerce. Orthogonal
divisions are also sometimes appropriate, perhaps along historical or theoretical lines.8
The lack of clear boundaries here does not render Lessig’s theory useless; indeed, flexibility
is of utmost utility when analyzing social systems. The four modalities are useful as a way of
reminding ourselves not to leave out anything important, and of highlighting relevant questions:
“Will cultural factors assist or impede the adoption of this technology?” “Will industry lobby the
government to ban this new technology?” “Will the government chose to regulate this behavior
directly, or by manipulating markets or technology?” ...and so on.
Even with a holistic analysis, it is possible to get carried away in aimless conjecture. Social
theories about technological development which are properly grounded in fact must align in
some way with the actual experiences of real–world people with real–world artifacts and
systems. Governments and corporations may not be conveniently (or cynically) endowed with
arbitrary motivations; they are composed of real persons with very human ambitions. End–users
may not be assumed to have the same concerns about a given piece of technology as its creators.
Real consumers are not always motivated by the simplistic desire to maximize personal wealth
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and material comfort — even though they would be easier to model mathematically if they were
— but by a whole host of quirks of human psychology, including a sense of fairness, sentimental
altruism, emotional backlash against betrayal and exploitation, self–righteousness, fear,
addiction, fads, carelessness, impulse, curiosity, and boredom.
The overriding goal is to identify the concrete ways in which people, technology, and their
structures (e.g. countries, corporations, markets, the Internet) interact, so as to understand how
perturbations may affect these systems.
In summary, to understand the relationship between social systems and technological
development, one must:
– Be holistic, considering the influence of a wide variety of social (government,
economics cultural norms) and non–social (technological and natural realities)
phenomena.
– Respect complex interdependencies.
– Be flexible in defining the units of analysis.
– Be grounded, describing theoretical interactions in terms of real–world entities
and processes.
I will strive to maintain these principles throughout the remainder of this thesis. The next
chapter begins the analysis by defining certain “units of analysis,” namely the identifiable groups
who each have a stake in the evolution of digital technology and copyright law.
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2 The People, Politics, and Ideology of
Copyright
2.1 Who Are the Stakeholders?
Despite the bi–polar appearance of the quotations that opened the first chapter, things “on the
ground” do not always divide up quite so neatly. To illustrate, let’s consider the life cycle of a
typical piece of music.9 A professional CD might be created by a team of songwriters, lyricists,
performers, graphic artists, producers, and technicians, all under contract with a major record
label. (An amateur one might be recorded at a concert or in a rented or hacked–together studio.)
A finished recording can be put up for sale at a retail outlet, where it might be purchased by
customers who had previously heard it on a conventional, cable, satellite, or Internet radio
station, or blaring from the sound system at a local restaurant.
That tune or the recording itself might find its way into jukebox, karaoke machine, player
piano, greeting card, conventional CD player, or CD–ROM reader; either might be featured in a
motion picture, play, television show, commercial, arcade game, amateur video, book of sheet
music, or a library’s audio collection. Accompanying lyrics might be found in a work of fiction,
a news story, or an Internet database. The music might be performed again — either by the
original artists or by others — at a concert, a party, a church ceremony, or government function.
A given work might be studied in a classroom, criticized in a review, or explained in a
documentary. A new generation of artists might be inspired to create new music in a similar
style, dance moves to go along with the music, or even new works of art which re–use pieces of
the lyrics, melody, or even the original recording itself. Books, plays, motion pictures, and other
works of art all, of course, have their own complex life cycles.
Clearly, there are more parties involved here than can be easily split up into creative content
“producers” and “consumers.” There are many possible intermediaries between the musical
creators and the people who enjoy their work; more importantly, all “producers” are also
“consumers” of previous works. It would be nearly impossible to write a book, compose a song,
or shoot a film (or at least any worthwhile one) without experiencing many pre–existing works in
these and related media. Figure 2.1 dissects the overlapping roles of producers, consumers, and
distributors into a more concrete (but not necessarily exhaustive or precise) set of interest groups.
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Name
and Roles Description Strong Examples
Creative
Talent
Produce,
Consume
Performers, artists, and intellectuals who
physically and intellectually create and
recorded a given work, or give live
performances.
Book and web authors, poets, singer–
songwriters, choreographers, graphic
artists, photographers, sculptors,
directors, actors, journalists, students,
comedians, lecturers, programmers.
Wholesalers
Produce,
Consume,
Distribute
Organizations engaged in distribution to
Exhibitors, Broadcasters, Retailers,
Libraries. May enter into exclusive
contracts with Creative Talent.
Movie studios, record labels,
publishing houses, university presses,
software publishers.
Exhibitors
Distribute
Organizations or individuals who
primarily present others’ work to the
public in a particular physical location.
Theaters (both motion picture and live
drama), museums, art festivals, library
and book store exhibitions.
Broadcasters
Distribute
Organizations or individuals who
primarily transmit their works to the
public, over a large physical area.
Television and radio stations carried by
terrestrial broadcast, satellite, cable, or
the Internet; public web sites.
Retailers
Distribute
Businesses engaged in selling or renting
material to the public.
Music, video, book, software, and art
stores; online content merchants.
Libraries
Distribute
Organizations primarily engaged in
lending material to the public or an
academic community.
Public and university libraries can have
vast catalogs of books, art, music,
video, and digital archives.
Exhibiting
Consumers
Distribute,
Consume
Organizations or individuals who use
music, pictures, quotations, etc. only to
enhance the experience of a larger event
or location.
Restaurants, shopping malls,
electronics stores, church choirs, party
hosts, rally organizers, teachers, and
lecturers.
Re–
Distributing
Consumers
Distribute,
Consume
Consumers who re–distribute (lend, sell,
or give away), re–exhibit, or re–
broadcast material to other Consumers.
Individuals who lend or make copies
of tapes and books; customers of used
book, music, and video stores; people
who share files on the Internet.
Individual
Consumers
Consume
Individuals who buy, rent, borrow, view,
listen to, or otherwise access works for
their own enjoyment or edification.
Radio listeners, TV viewers, web
surfers, retail patrons, concertgoers,
museum and library patrons, music
enthusiasts, commuters, bookworms,
theatergoers, computer users.
Producing
Consumers
Produce,
Consume
Next generation of Creative Talent
which creates entirely new content,
“samples” existing works, or merely
works with similar ideas or genres.
Cover artists, students, journalists;
critics, satirists, scientists, Free/Open
Source programmers, fans, “found art”
artists, general Creative Talent.
Figure 2.1: Direct participants in content industries
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Note that I have designated all “producers” as “consumers” as well, reflecting the fact that
though originality is certainly required to produce new “content,” no one ever really creates
anything in an intellectual vacuum. In the United States, “creative talent” may, by contract,
transfer all or part of the ownership to another party,10 and works created by employees are
automatically assigned to the employer.11 These two mechanisms are used by Wholesalers (as
defined in Figure 2.1) in the music and motion picture industries, respectively, to acquire
ownership of sound recordings and movies. For example, my copy of the Dave Matthews Band
CD, Crash, indicates that the recording is owned by BMG Entertainment. Dipping into my video
collection, I see that Paramount Pictures owns the copyright on Ferris Bueller’s Day Off. A
quick survey of a typical American home A/V collection should quickly reveal that in the vast
majority of cases, performers do not actually own the recordings which feature them. This is why
I have identified Wholesalers as both producer–consumers and distributors in Figure 2.1.
We would expect self–interested producers, as a class, to seek the greatest monetary
compensation for their works that the available markets will bear. On the other hand, some
producers might not be motivated by the promise of financial reward; an overlapping group are
likely to be concerned about maintaining their creative freedom, regardless of profit potential.
There is also the question of allocation of profit between Creative Talent and Wholesalers, which
subsequent chapters will address in more detail.
Consumers, Libraries, Exhibitors, and non–profit Broadcasters would logically be concerned
not only with the cost of content, but also with its (possibly subjective) quality, freedom to make
use of legitimately obtained content without substantial technological or legal hindrances, and
the diversity of creative voices. We would expect the remaining (for–profit) distributors to be
most interested in keeping profits high. This involves keeping down the prices they pay to
Wholesalers, optimizing the product of retail prices and retail volumes, and interesting
consumers in the content they have for sale. Complicating the picture further, consumers and
other end–users would benefit from lower prices, and Creative Talent might receive greater
compensation, if the various intermediaries could be eliminated. These intermediaries do provide
useful services, however, including financing, publicity, editorial selection, risk management,
inventory storage and delivery, and aggregation. Some innovative technical solution or
alternative social arrangements would be needed to replicate these if “disintermediation” is to be
feasible.
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In addition to the groups identified so far, there are a number of indirect participants in the
intellectual content industries. Equipment manufacturers (including the makers of VCRs; DVD
players; sound systems; TVs and set–top boxes; PCs, content viewing, editing, and production
software; e–books; game consoles; camcorders) have an obvious economic interest in
maintaining a high level of consumer demand for their products. They would rather not be
constrained by legal requirements that they construct their devices in ways that their customers
might dislike. For similar reasons, no company wants to get stuck making devices that only
support unpopular storage and transmission formats, so long–term predictability in that regard
benefits them, though technological changes can also generate lots of sales volume. Both
equipment manufacturers and telecommunications “common carriers” (phone, cable, and
satellite companies; and Internet Service Providers, or ISPs) have an interest in avoiding liability
for contributory or vicarious copyright infringement (this will be explored in detail in chapter 4).
As you recall from chapter 1 and Lessig’s theory of the modalities of regulation, the power of
the state can be used to structure technical, economic, and social systems. Each of the content
industry stakeholders identified so far has specific economic and social interests they would like
to advance; Lessig’s theory should remind us that copyright law is a vehicle by which they might
do so.
2.2 Lobbying and the Law
The stakeholders of section 2.1 lay their competing concerns over costs, ownership, and the
general health of the content industries, at the feet of Congress, which must resolve these
conflicts in the form of legislation. The character of the resulting law has changed considerably
over time. Lessig describes the Copyright Act of 1790 and how differently that law functions
from the current statutes:
“The initial act gave authors an exclusive right to publish and vend ‘maps, charts
and books.’ It therefore essentially regulated only publishers, of which there were
about 130 in 1790. The act did not regulate other kinds of writings, such as music
or newspapers; nor did it restrict the use of the writings that it did regulate. That
is, one could copy, translate or make a derivative use of these maps, charts and
books without the permission of the author. The act therefore gave the author no
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real control over the work once published, beyond limitation on competition. The
initial term of this protection was relatively short — 14 years — and the vast
majority of ‘writings’ were never copyrighted. (Between 1790 and 1799, 13,000
titles were published in America, but only 556 were copyrighted.)”
“Since 1790, a lot has changed. Copyright is no longer restricted to ‘maps, charts
and books.’ It reaches anything ‘fixed in a tangible medium of expression.’ It no
longer regulates only publishers; it reaches anyone who makes a ‘copy.’ Nor is
copyright limited to copying: A derivate use of the original work can also be
subject to the original copyright. And finally, no longer is the initial term
relatively short — for individuals, the term is the life of the author plus 70 years
(for Irving Berlin, 144 years); for a company, the term is 95 years (for Windows
95, until 2090). Copyright has thus morphed from a short, relatively insignificant
regulation of publishers, to a restriction that is effectively perpetual, and that
regulates everyone with access to a computer or Xerox...machine.”12
The changes in between have followed a clear pattern. Law professor and author Jessica
Litman has a wonderfully illustrative history of the practicalities and disputes surrounding
copyright law in the twentieth century in her book, Digital Copyright.13 As she points out, at the
dawn of that period, most copying technologies used to be considerably more expensive and
rarer than they are now. As both Litman and Lessig illustrate, it was businesses, not individual
consumers, who then controlled the means of distribution; in these circumstances, copyright law
becomes essentially a means to settle disputes and normalize relationships between businesses.
Where consumers did have access to technology that permitted “unauthorized” copying or
performance, they were generally left to their own devices; strict ownership over these rights was
apparently not deemed worthwhile to enact or enforce. So the general public, Litman reports, has
not historically been particularly concerned with copyright legislation.
Over time, she continues, technological changes (and concurrent economic changes) begin to
disturb the balance of interests which stabilizes the business relationships which have been
encoded in the law. The disadvantaged parties then begin to lobby Congress to change the law.
Each time this has happened in the twentieth century, as Litman chronicles in detail, Congress
has essentially acted as a facilitator for resolving conflicts among the parties, which in addition
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to the established business, generally include new types of production companies, artists, and
equipment manufacturers. (For example, the new “talking picture” studios, or player piano
makers.) Once these companies have negotiated a compromise amongst themselves (often at
great length), Congress enacts the result into law, generally with a minimum of fuss. But, as
Litman points out, not all of the true stakeholders are necessarily invited to or express interest in
participating in these negotiations. In her history, this includes nascent industries which are at the
time either too small to be invited, or not politically astute enough to invite themselves — and
the individual consumer.
This pattern essentially continued into the late 1990s, culminating in the negotiated
compromise that passed Congress in the form of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998.14
The DMCA is in part a response of copyright owners to the latest destabilizing technology — the
Internet. It bans any technology which can be used to circumvent copy protection systems
embedded in hardware or software, but grants certain exceptions for security research, library
use, personal privacy, and reverse engineering. This helps protect the established interests of
copyright owners and commercial distribution intermediaries against the threat of unlimited
numbers of perfect digital copies circulating on the Internet and undermining their businesses. It
mandates that all new analog VCRs include a certain kind of copy protection called Macrovision
which prevents unauthorized copying, but prohibits owners from using this technology to “lock
up” anything but premium television services. Internet Service Providers and search engine
maintainers are granted exemption from liability, provided they meet certain conditions and
follow certain procedures, all designed to make it easy for private copyright owners to control
the illegal use of their content.
Litman argues (convincingly) that in the debate leading up to the passage of the DMCA, the
most influential interests were those of large corporations. She lists “the motion picture industry,
the music recording industry, the book publishers, and the software publishing industry on behalf
of the ‘content owners’ and the online and Internet service provider industry, the telephone
companies, the television and radio broadcasters, [and] computer and consumer electronics
manufacturers...on behalf of the ‘user interests.’”15 Litman is cognizant of the fact that all of
these groups have interests which do not dovetail with the artists or individual consumers whose
“side” they are supposed to share. In any case, my general point is to illustrate how some of the
parties from section 2.1 have indeed successfully used the tool of government to favor their own
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interests. Later chapters will examine in more detail the merits of these laws, but first, we need to
establish a normative framework in which to evaluate them.
2.3 Social Goals and Ideology
“We are at a critical moment in the history of our future because we are now
witnessing the defeat of what 2000 years had built — the defeat of the open
society, the triumph of the closed society, and the destruction of an intellectual
commons. And we are witnessing this defeat at the hands of an enemy who has
coopted the rhetoric of our past — the rhetoric of freedom that was organized
under this ideal of property.”
— Lawrence Lessig16
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has become something of a poster child for what is
really a larger trend in copyright changes over the past century. To understand the direction the
law has been headed, and to understand the later half of the path from 1790 to 1998, I turn once
again to Jessica Litman, who argues17 that the “theory” of copyright law has evolved since 1900
through the following stages:
“Quid Pro Quo” — 1900 onward: “The dominant metaphor for copyright was the notion of
a quid pro quo. The public granted authors limited exclusive rights (and only if the authors
fulfilled a variety of formal conditions) in return for the immediate public dissemination of the
work and the eventual dedication of the work in its entirety into the public domain.”18
“The Copyright Bargain” — pre–1976: “Copyright was a bargain between the public and
the author, whereby the public bribed the author to create new works in return for limited
commercial control over the new expression the author brought to her works. The public’s
payoff was that, beyond the borders of the authors’ defined exclusive rights, it was entitled to
enjoy, consume, learn from, and reuse the works.”19
“Intellectual Property” — post–1976: “Copyright provides an economic incentive for the
creation and the distribution of original works of authorship.... Copyright has been transformed
into the right of a property owner to protect what is rightfully hers. (That allows us to skip right
past the question of what it is, exactly, that ought to be rightfully hers.)”20
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Especially in the past two decades, the growing influence of copyright owners (mostly, as I
have mentioned, corporations) has produced something of a backlash, in the form of a counter–
movement. Jon “Hannibal” Stokes, an editor at Ars Technica,21 paints a picture of two extreme
ideologies22: proponents of this Intellectual Property theory, “intent on letting the ‘free’ market
determine a value for information,” and what I will call the “Information Freedom” camp.
Stokes says that Intellectual Property advocates usually feel “that the anti–IP rhetoric coming
from the first camp is merely a rationale for piracy,” while those who hold to the notion of
Intellectual Freedom see the other camp as “mindless shills for the corporate machine.” He then
stakes out some middle ground, saying:
“Somewhere in between these two extremes lies a large majority who find both
extremes attractive for different reasons, but who can’t in good conscience
commit to one stance or the other. These people (myself included) on the one
hand acknowledge the many benefits that IP law has yielded in the modern
economy, but on the other hand worry about the ever–encroaching technological
and legal threats to our personal freedoms by large, moneyed corporations
wielding bands of lawyers.”23
There is some notion in American democracy (though it is debatable to what degree it is held
and how well it is followed in practice) that the law should not be a product of ideological
battles, per se. Instead, it should be architected to best achieve certain democratically determined
social goals, which may or may not align with any given school of thought. Merely participating
in the struggle between two diametrically opposed positions will not lead us to any acceptable
resolution of these problems with any speed or certainty of conclusion.24
Among informed people who thoughtfully consider the competing interests of section 2.1,
there should arise general consensus on at least the set of problems to be solved, though there
may be less agreement on how to solve them. The general set of social goals includes:
– Production of creative content should be encouraged; hence, content creators
should be financially rewarded for their work.
– Compensation of content creators must not be excessive, lest it place an unfair
burden on consumers, prevent too many of them from experiencing works of
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value, and devote too many resources toward content industries in comparison
to other, unrelated social goals.
– Collection of compensation fees should not excessively impede the creation of
new works or advancement of science, technology politics, art, and culture.
– Creative freedom should be maintained.
– Quality of work is important.
– Diversity of creators is important.
We these goals in mind, we can then follow Stokes’ advice to focus on debating which legal,
technical, economic, and normative “structures” will — in an empirical sense — best achieve
these goals.25 Both the Intellectual Property and Information Freedom paradigms do emphasize
certain practical tools for achieving these goals, which are worth examining before moving on.
2.3.1 Creative Content as Intellectual Property
“Rivalrous” goods are those which are depleted by using them, or which only a finite number
of people can use at any given time. These include many physical goods, like water, land, and
metal tools. Our society has created a system of “property rights” which encourage production
and regulate consumption of rivalrous goods. Recalling Lessig’s four modalities of regulation,
we notice that property rights are enforced by a framework of laws (stealing will get you thrown
in jail), social norms (thievery is not generally socially acceptable) and technology (locks,
fences, and alarm systems). In this regime, most decision–making is left up to market forces.
Scarce goods are usually allocated to those willing to pay the most money for them, and human
attention is usually devoted to the creation and modification of goods that will command high
profits on the market.
The concept of Intellectual Property26 simply extends these well–known rules and structures
to non–rivalrous, information–based goods. (Digital information is non–rivalrous because an
unlimited number of people may enjoy the same resource; the cost of copying is negligible.)
Under this system, individual and organization automatically receive the right to exploit the full
market potential of goods they create (not the necessarily what they possess; that rule only
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makes sense for physical goods). Unauthorized digital copying is thus “theft”; organized theft is
“piracy.” In the words of the Recording Industry Association of America:
“No black flags with skull and crossbones, no cutlasses, cannons, or daggers
identify today’s pirates...[they] operate not on the high seas but on the Internet, in
illegal CD factories, distribution centers, and on the street. The pirate’s credo is
still the same — why pay for it when it’s so easy to steal? The credo is as wrong
as it ever was. Stealing is still illegal, unethical, and all too frequent in today’s
digital age. That is why RIAA continues to fight music piracy.”27
Likewise, the Motion Picture Association of America issued a press release, quoting its own
President and CEO:
“‘Creative property is private property. To take it without permission, without
payment to its owners, collides with the core values of this society.’ Valenti
wondered aloud why ‘otherwise rational people who would not dream of stealing
a videocassette off the shelf of a Blockbuster store are using movies without
permission or payment.’”28
Intellectual Property proponents (led by large content–producing corporations) have argued
to Congress that new technology is in danger of undermining not only the economic prosperity
of content owners, but also consumers. The International Intellectual Property Association
represents seven large book, motion picture, music, and software trade associations, including
the MPAA. Commenting on a Department of Commerce white paper that lead to the passage of
the DMCA, it said:
“To the extent that [intellectual property protection is] weakened or undercut, the
spectrum of information and entertainment products and services made available
over digital networks, and the functionality of the networks themselves to end
users, will shrink to the lower end of the value chain, or perhaps disappear
altogether.”29
In summary, the central idea of Intellectual Property is just what it sounds like —
information should be owned or “propertized” and traded on the free market.
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2.3.2 Information Freedom
“[T]he ‘information wants to be free’ camp...advocates the free and communal
sharing of information and rejects any notion that products of the intellect can or
should be understood, legally or philosophically, as property.”
— Jon Stokes30
Lessig’s thesis in The Future of Ideas31 is that applying the same propertization scheme to
non–rivalrous information as we have for rivalrous physical goods is not only inappropriate, but
causes serious real–world harm. Because of the strict control this gives owners over the use of
their works, he argues, propertization can both hamper access to creative works and stifle
technical, business, and cultural innovation. He quotes from An Evolutionary Theory of
Economic Change, a “classic text” on the subject by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter:
“[I]nnovation in the economic system — and indeed the creation of any sort of
novelty in art, science, or practical life — consists to a substantial extent of a
recombination of conceptual and physical materials that were previously in
existence. The vast momentum of scientific, technological, and economic
progress in the modern world derives largely from the fact that each new
achievement is not merely the answer to a particular problem, but also a new item
in the vast storehouse of components that are available for use, in ‘new
combinations,’ in the solution of other problems in the future.”32
In addition to maintaining free access to intellectual “construction materials,” Lessig argues
that technology must be regulated in such a way as to preserve “freedom of innovation.” People
with new ideas should not have to ask permission of the government or information owners
before implementing them. The established powers historically squashed such innovations
because they were seen as either impractical or a threat to existing revenue streams or power
arrangements. Lessig draws a parallel between the way AT&T resisted the introduction of packet
switching technology (the basis of the modern Internet, and increasingly, AT&T’s own network)
and the way record and movie companies today are resisting new technologies. Like the Internet
itself, these new distribution systems threaten to compete with and undermine the profits of
established players.
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To solve this “innovator’s dilemma” (drawing on Christensen’s case studies of how rational,
market–based decision–making can lead to stagnation33) Lessig advocates replacing government
and market–based controls with “norms–based” regulation. Certain resources, he argues, should
not be “owned” by any one entity; instead, they should be free for all to use. “Control” and
“regulation” seem awkward terms for this regime of non–control, but “freeing” resources does
not mean their use will become disorganized. Lessig uses the example of the highway system to
illustrate this point. In order to provide for public safety, the government issues licenses, traffic
regulations, and rules about hazardous cargoes. But in most cases, anyone is free to use any
highway at any time, no matter the social or economic reason one might have for traveling.
Approval of the government is not needed for novel business models that make use of the
system, or for new technologies that traverse it (provided they meet safety standards). The key
point is that the value of the national highway system is greatly enhanced because it is
“unowned” and publicly maintained. This sort of purpose–specific permission is needed,
however, from copyright owners, in order to make use of their works in certain ways. The Future
of Ideas highlights several Internet innovations that are inhibited by the current emphasis on
ownership in copyright law. These include new distribution methods for music, video, and
books, as well as wholly new products, like lyrics databases.
This idea of an unowned “intellectual commons,” which Lessig advocates in both Ideas and
his previous book, Code,34 has already gained some amount of popularity in one area —
software. In 1984, Richard Stallman launched the GNU project35, which aimed at producing a
Free version of Unix, a computer operating system created by AT&T. Free, that is, in the sense
of giving users the freedom to copy and modify it; in Lessig’s terms, making it an “unowned”
resource. In his GNU Manifesto36, Stallman invited developers across the world to collaborate on
this project, for the benefit of all. Since that time, many Free Software projects, including GNU,
have worked together to produce (among many others): Linux (an operating system), Sendmail
(an e–mail server), and Apache (a web server), BIND (a DNS server), and Perl (a programming
language) — all of which are now in widespread use, and which compete vigorously with their
“owned” counterparts.
The general idea of Free software (also called Open Source software37) is that the original
author gives blanket permission for others to copy, modify, or use the program. The “source
code” — the human–readable version of the program — is also made publicly available to
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facilitate modification. Technically, the program is still “owned” by the original creator, but the
legal tool of blanket permission is used to give the effect of an “unowned,” common resource.
Free software is not always free in a monetary sense, as entrepreneurs are free to sell unaltered or
modified copies as they wish, though they must compete with others who may give away the
same code for free. This does happen in practice; for example, the Red Hat companies sells its
popular Linux distribution on CD. Modem users find this packaging more convenient than the
free Internet download which the companies offers; these consumers also get technical support
and other services from the company for their money.
One problem that Stallman saw with Free software was that private companies could make
proprietary changes which they would choose not to contribute back to the community. They
could then claim copyright on these modifications, and would have a monopoly on sales thereof.
A split would occur between the users of the Free and of the proprietary versions, the latter of
which might be granted no access to the source code, and might be denied permission to modify
or copy the software.
“Copylefted” software goes one step further and prohibits modified versions from remaining
proprietary. Stallman promoted use of the GNU General Public License38 (GPL) by copyright
owners as a way to implement “Copyleft” in a legally enforceable way. For example, the Free
Software Foundation holds the copyright on many portions of the Linux operating system (which
it prefers to call the GNU/Linux operating system, in recognition of the significant contributions
of the GNU Project) and makes this material available under the GPL. If Red Hat or any other
distributors of the software attempted to sell or even give away a modified version without
releasing the source code as well, the offending party would risk a copyright infringement
lawsuit from the Foundation. This is because copyright law gives owners the right to control
“derivative” works; the GPL only grants blanket permission for the creation of Free derivative
works, not proprietary ones. In practice, a variety of both Copylefted and other Free licenses
have become popular.39
When an individual or corporate user makes an improvement to a piece of Free Software to
solve a particular problem for their own benefit, they may find it more economical to contribute
this improvement back to the community, regardless of their legal obligations. The user will
benefit from further improvements made by others based on their contribution, and to the
software in general, without having to track the many differences that would otherwise arise
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between the internal and mainstream versions of the software. Communal software development
eliminates redundant effort and helps manage the always significant burden of construction and
debugging by spreading the work around. Even users who do not actively modify the software
themselves may find it beneficial to be freed from the long–term reliance on a single vendor for
support, repairs, and modification, which proprietary software requires.
The ideology of Information Freedom provides clear legal and economic models that are
useful for software. Translating these into sustainable models for other content industries,
however, is more difficult. Traditional books, music and films are generally not produced in
collaboration with their audiences. Continuing repair and improvement is generally not a concern
for these works, primarily because they are creative and expressive in nature, as opposed to
software, which is really more like a machine that happens to manipulate information.
If they gain nothing by Freeing their works, why should artists and authors be asked to forfeit
the compensation that retaining property exploitation rights would give them (even if most must
seek supplementary income to support themselves anywayi)? It may serve the other social goals I
mentioned in section 2.1 to force them do so, but the question of how to support and encourage
content creators remains.
Many Information Freedom advocates, like Lawrence Lessig40, prominent Open Source
advocates such as Eric Raymond,41 author of The Cathedral and the Bazaar42 , and others43
support Information Freedom for practical reasons, and so presumably support applying the
philosophy only where it does practical good. (Lessig, in fact, argues for a hybrid
owned/unowned system.)On the other hand, Richard Stallman is well known for promoting Free
Software for ethical reasons44 (in addition to compelling practical ones). Still others oppose the
Intellectual Property regime because they find it to be an unethical or improper abridgment of the
Libertarian ideal of free speech.45,46 But even Stallman has expressed hesitation47 about applying
Copyleft licensing to other media, though he firmly endorses it for scientific journals,48
encyclopedias,49 and software documentation.50
i “There are probably only a few hundred self–employed writers in the US,” says Brian Martin, author of
Information Liberation (Freedom Press, London, 1998), citing: David Vaver, “Intellectual property today: of
myths and paradoxes,” Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 69, No. 1, March 1990, pp. 98–128. As it happens, Martin
has posted his entire book online; the third chapter, from which the above quotation is taken, is available at
<http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/98il/il03.html>;accessed 30 Jan. 2002. Martin is a professor at
the University of Wollongong, so he need not depend on royalties from book sales to support himself. On the
other hand, I am paying MIT for the privilege of bringing you this thesis for free.
23
Others have no such reservations. The Open Content project at Harvard’s Berkman Center
for Internet and Society encourages all content creators to use the [cc] symbol to apply a
“counter copyright” to works to donate them to the “copyright commons.”51 In a similar fashion,
Ram Samudrala, in his vision of a “Free Music Philosophy,”52 encourages artists to “free” their
music by granting blanket permission to copy. A profusion of GPL–like licenses and associated
registries have been conceived to promote the idea of giving away content.53
2.4 Myth: The Internet Cannot Be Regulated
“It was not at all clear...how, or even if, corporations could own or manage the
airwaves. It seemed that wireless might be the truly democratic, decentralized
communication technology people had yearned for, a device each individual
would control and use whenever he or she wanted, without tolls, and without
operators.”
— Susan Douglas...on the wireless telegraph in 1899.54
“No one can stop me from paying once, then copying and distributing the content
for free. Legal and technical means of preventing me from doing so are doomed
from the outset — or they will create a big brother world.”
— A pseudonymous Technolibertarian55
Some Information Freedom proponents seem to share many things in common, including:
being employed in the information technology industry, having the ability to program computers,
being an “early adopter” of new technology, subscribing to libertarian ideals,56 reading the news
site Slashdot,57 and of course, supporting Open Source (or Free) software. I would like to give
people who fit this loose description a name: the Technolibertarians. This group (partly by
definition) is predisposed to certain beliefs which sometimes border on the absurd. In the
remainder of this chapter, I would like to focus on one particular idea, which is embodied in
these three classically Technolibertarian statements, which James Boyle calls the “Internet
Trinity”:58
“The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”59
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“[I]n Cyberspace, the First Amendment is a local ordinance.”60
“Information Wants to be Free.”61
All three, when understood in context, relate to a single underlying theme: the internet is
difficult or impossible for real–world governments to control. It cannot be censored, it cannot be
localized, and it cannot be stopped. For the purposes of this thesis, it is the idea that no matter
what the technical barrier to sharing copyrighted material, there is always an easy way around it.
I’m exaggerating only a little — many Technolibertarians seem to think that the sheer technical
and economic advantages the Internet offers over older systems will inevitably undermine nearly
any restriction that any particular government (or business) wishes to place on it. In fact, though,
traditional nation–states and corporations will continue to have quite significant influence on the
nature and use of the Internet for a long time to come, just as they have come to dominate the use
of radio technology.
It is tempting to think, given how private, anonymous, and divorced from normal, worldly
affairs the Internet can seem to be, that it is its own universe, that “cyberspace” is a place apart
from “meatspace.”62 But it is not. When we are “in cyberspace,” we are also sitting at a computer
somewhere in the “real world,” and we are still subject to its laws, just as much as if we were
doing anything else. We may sometimes forget that the signals we send over the Internet
propagate over real–world wires and through real–world computers maintained by real–world
individuals and organizations, all of which are also subject to government intervention. The
Internet is no more of a libertarian panacea in this century than wireless telegraph technology
was in the last.63
In the United States, government regulates many private behaviors in which one person
harms or potentially harms another. These include, for example, personal injury, theft,
kidnapping, extortion, threats, fraud, trespass, invasion of privacy, construction of buildings,
private contracts, maintenance of property, and possession and use of weapons and other
dangerous objects. It regulates an even wider variety of behaviors that take place in the public
sphere, including public commerce, public speech (e.g. in newspapers, libel, fraud, and copyright
violations; in radio, these and also unlicensed transmitters), and personal movement and
locomotion.
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Using its powers of investigation, arrest, and punishment, the government has the ability to
physically prevent, indirectly deter, and bodily interrupt behaviors which it deems harmful. This
sort of regulation is more or less successful depending on how easily the harmful behavior is
detected, including whether or not it occurs in public. It is also dependent on democratically
imposed limitations on government — for instance, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is
partially hindered in its goal of completely preventing domestic violence by its Constitutional
inability to monitor the interiors of all private residences, and the need for trials, limited
punishments, and other measures of due process. Lawrence Lessig would interject at this point
that governments also have the power to influence social norms, change economic
circumstances, and regulate (or physically alter) technological artifacts. These things, in turn,
also regulate behavior.
For activities that take place in the public sphere, a government can most effectively exercise
its powers of investigation, arrest, and punishment if these conditions are met:
– Laws exist to regulate the behavior
– Enforcement agencies have the appropriate expertise
– Enforcement agencies have sufficient financial and personnel resources
– The responsible party can be tracked down
– The responsible party is in an accessible jurisdiction
If we accept that the government is able to successfully in reducing speeding, illegal parking,
the wearing of seatbelts, smoking, and drug dealing (whether or not those efforts are completely
successful and whether or not we think they are prudent), then at the present time, it is difficult to
claim that success in regulating public behavior online is any more difficult. In fact, it may be
easier to do so.
Why is this? Virtually all of the transactions offered today in the “electronic marketplace” of
the Internet, including public sharing of copyrighted material, are quite easily and legally
detected, even by the average technically astute private citizen. Internet Protocol addresses can
be traced back to the responsible parties with the cooperation of the Internet Service Provider,
which may be compelled with a search warrant. Most Internet users live either within the United
States itself, or in other cooperative jurisdictions that also recognize copyright infringement as a
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crime. As we shall see in chapters 4 and 5, certain private entities — especially signal carriers
and copyright owners — find it in their power and self–interest to engage in their own brands of
copyright enforcement.
To be fair, there are a number of ways in which new technology, if properly applied, could
frustrate regulatory efforts, including, for example, strong anonymity and offshore data servers.64
Traders of copyrighted goods may also avoid detection by making their transactions private and
covert, though this will likely significantly reduce the impact on legitimate markets, and also
reduce the amount of unauthorized materials that are available. Governments can take further
steps to increase the costs of violating the law, and to reduce the benefits. To thwart parties that
avoid domestic regulation by flocking overseas, the government may, for instance, freeze
domestic assets, or instruct telecommunications providers to block access to offending foreign
sites. One examples of successful Internet–related international enforcement of copyright,
discussed in chapter 5, is the successful shutdown of the Canadian iCraveTV, by U.S. movie
studios. A recent Washington Post article highlights a number of other examples, including
regulation of online gambling, Nazi memorabilia, and broadcasts of the Olympics.65
A compelling question to ask at this point, is who will win — or at least dominate — this
“arms race” between hackers and governments? This prompts other questions which focus on
economic, social, and legal interactions and changes. How much effort will people go through in
order to circumvent copyright laws? Is it socially acceptable to do so? What if changes in the
industry produce what is perceived to be a reasonably priced, legal alternative? How much
technical copy protection will be necessary, balancing the costs thereof and industry goals? What
laws go further than citizens are willing to accept? Will it be more politically expedient to direct
more public money into digital law enforcement, to insist the problem is being dealt with by
existing laws and public and private agencies, or to actually go back and change the law to be
more permissive? In chapter 6, I will try answer questions like these in more detail, as well as to
address the question of what legal, economic, technical, and normative “structures” exist to help
achieve the overriding social goals I identified in section 2.3. The intervening chapters will
provide the empirical detail necessary to support my conclusions, beginning with the history of
telecommunications, and then continuing with the contemporary music and motion picture
entertainment industries.
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3 Lessons of History — Mass
Telecommunications
3.1 Theory
Thomas Jefferson once remarked: “He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction
himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening me....Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”66 The
Technolibertarians of chapter 2 have co–opted both Jefferson and his fire analogy67 as allies.
They (and other Information Freedom advocates) argue that the new possibilities of the new and
different digital medium should not be wasted68 by the carrying forward of old rules and homage
paid to old interests.69 This is exactly what they accuse the large corporate interests in the content
industries — music, movies, print, and computer software and games — of doing. They are
“manufacturing scarcity”70 by using legal and technical tools to restrict the unauthorized access
to and copying of information, in a way that preserves the “offline” status quo.
In the context of history, this is not very surprising. There have been countless economic and
technological innovations that have been resisted by incumbent interests because they threatened
to disrupt existing business. For example, AT&T strongly resisted the introduction of packet–
switching (Internet–like) technology in the 1960s, which it believed would threaten its telephone
monopoly.71 Likewise, Litman’s legal history (section 2.2) shows powerful business interests
using their influence in the American legislative process to favor themselves over upstart
industries. “Progress” in content industries, when it happens, is usually a struggle. But
entrenched business interests are not the only source of “friction” preventing change from being
nearly instantaneous. Rendering a given technology acceptable to consumers,finding an
economic niche in which to market it, and culturally integrating it into the fabric of daily life,
inescapably takes time. To summarize and expand on these notions, the next section will use the
history of telecommunications technology to provide evidence of the following pattern:
– When a telecommunications technology is first introduced, the new medium is
at first envisioned as an extension of old, familiar media.
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– Integration of revolutionary technology into most people’s daily lives takes
decades. New technology needs adjustment — it needs evolutionary change
— before it is convenient and cost effective enough to succeed on the market,
if it ever does. This evolution requires economic experimentation and cultural
adaptation, and may be delayed by any number of “external” factors.72
– In the long term, the dominant or otherwise most significant uses of a new
telecommunication technology may be quite different from both original
expectations for that medium and from the ways in which existing
technologies are used.
– New uses which threaten existing economic and power structures are resisted by
incumbents.
3.2 Historical Evidence
The third point is borne out by the history of the first electrical telecommunications
technology. The first electric telegraph was put into service in 1838; the primary application of
the new technology was sending person–to–person messages, like postal mail. Over time,
newspapers began to use the “wires” in a new way — delivering information in real time to
central offices from the field, and from there directly to certain customers. The Associated Press,
formed in 1848, was the first “telegraphic press association.”73
The development of radio prompted even more radical innovation. Guglielmo Marconi was
successfully demonstrating wireless telegraph functionality to European militaries by 1898;74 a
brief investment “bubble” arose in America financial markets in 1901,75 reminiscent of the “dot
com” Internet boom of 2000. By 1907 demonstrations of wireless audio (speech and music, as
opposed to dots and dashes) were attracting significant business interest, though commercial
expectations and development focused on point–to–point communication (like the telegraph and
the later telephone) rather than broadcast, until as late as 1920.76 The success of the most direct
application, the wireless phone, however, had to wait for 1980s–era technology before wireless
phones could be made small and cheap enough for the mass market.
Things began to change in the early 1920s, by which time the introduction of vacuum–tube
equipment had made broad–area transmissions more practical, the wholesale government seizure
29
of the radio spectrum necessitated by World War I had ended, and amateur radio operators had
begun to popularize the medium, which more and more contained voices and music rather than
Morse Code. Early radio “broadcasts,” meant for what small general audience there was at the
time, were supported by radio manufacturers, in order to boost equipment sales, but this business
model did not survive long. In 1922, AT&T started broadcasting advertisements for the first time
on its flagship station, WEAF.77 It called the service “toll broadcasting” or “radio telephony.”
The broadcast studio was like a telephone booth; interested parties would pay for the privilege of
delivering a message to whoever was listening at the other end. After a few months, it realized
than in order to make the endeavor economically feasible, it would actually have to provide
programming between the commercial announcements.78 The process of refinement and adoption
went slowly; it would take until 1934 for commercial radio to reach even half of American
households.79
Meanwhile, early “mechanical scanning disc” televisions had made their very limited debut
in England in 1928.80 Commercial broadcasts suitable for modern black–and–white electron–gun
sets began in the U.S. in 1939.81 At first, high equipment cost resulted in slow sales; then,
production was interrupted by the United States’ entry into World War II. The cost of a typical
TV set fell from (in today’s dollars) about $4,500 in 1940 to just over $1,000 in 1948, when
market penetration reached about 10%. As prices continued to drop, the adoption rate increased;
50% of American homes were receiving television programs by 1953.82 Color TV made its
sputtering start in the consumer market starting in the mid 50s.83
While broadcast television is obviously quite different from radio in its capabilities and
personal impact, it did not really necessitate innovation in the business models supporting set
manufacture, content creation, and delivery. Like most radio of the era, television was generally
supported by advertising; the dominant players were a small number of networks (NBC, CBS,
and ABC) which provided general–interest national feeds to local stations.84 Cable and satellite
TV, on the other hand, enable both subscription–based business models and a much wider
variety of niche programming and niche formats (all–news, all–movie, all–weather, all–cartoon,
all–kid, all–comedy, all–history, all–game–show, and so on). These technologies were not
available, however, until the 1960s, and their adoption has been even slower. Even in 1996, cable
television had achieved only 65% penetration in the American market.85
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3.3 Expectations for Digital Technology
What does this pattern of change predict about new digital technologies and copyright law?
Taking the points of the theory one by one, first, we should expect initial offerings and
terminology to resemble older media. Examples we can find online today include digital
“newspapers,” Internet “radio stations,” electronic “mail,” e–“books,” and even e–“commerce”
in electronic “stores.” While some of these technologies — e–mail, for instance — have become
quite popular, others, like Internet telephony (“voice over IP”) and e–books, have not. I have not
done enough research to know which properties these services must have before consumers will
prefer them, and what business models are likely to be successful in this realm. But these are
interesting questions, which the market will answer more fully in time.
This is also evidence in support of the second point, namely, that most people will not use a
new communications medium right away, often because evolutionary (rather than revolutionary)
changes to the technology are needed to facilitate adoption. These developments still take a good
deal of time. Despite the tremendous speedups over the past century in the mundane tasks of
transmitting information, and to a lesser degree, finding and presenting it,86 other tasks —
manipulating information, achieving understanding, and cooking up new ideas — still take as
long as they ever did. There has been no fundamental innovation that accelerates economic
experiments, in which new products and services are researched, prototyped, refined, mass
marketed, and finally replaced or withdrawn, and in which new business models are tested,
improved, succeed, and fail.
A brief tour through more recent history with the canonical Hobbes Internet Timeline87
reveals that this newest telecommunications technology also fits the pattern of relatively slow
social integration. The seemingly explosive emergence of e–mail and the World Wide Web in
the past few years is really the culmination of decades of R&D and behind–the–scenes technical,
economic, and social developments. The two underlying technologies of the web are hypertext,
the interlinking of documents in the way that modern web pages are connected, and computer
networking. The first public demonstration of a working hypertext system was in 1968 by
Douglas Englebart;88 basic Internet–like packet–switching technology was demonstrated in 1969
by connecting four computers together to form the primitive ARPANet. Inter–computer e–mail,
including the modern “@” symbol, was running on the network by 1972. Popular adoption of
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these technologies, however, required that computers be affordable to the general public. When
this happened in the 1980s, the decentralized, interconnected, and privately owned Internet we
have today did not immediately take shape. Instead, among those that used their computers for
networking, stand–alone dialup systems became popular, like public Bulletin Board Services
(BBSes) and commercial services like AOL, Compuserve, and Prodigy. The communications
protocols (TCP/IP) that define the modern Internet were introduced on January 1, 1983, and in
1986 a small boom of connectivity began in American academia. The public had to wait another
half–decade before commercial Internet Service Providers (ISPs) became available in 1990;
restrictions on commercial activity on the network were not lifted until 1991.
Though file sharing over the network had long been possible via FTP (the File Transmission
Protocol), in 1991 the introduction of modern Web protocols (HTTP, the HyperText
Transmission Protocol, and HTML, the HyperText Markup Language, in which Web pages are
written) improved on this process of retrieving related documents, even if they were in vastly
different locations. In 1994, mainstream governmental institutions started serving up information
over the nascent Web.89 Even so, it was not until the later half of the second decade of modern
Internet operation that widespread adoption of Web technology really took place. In 1995, only
5% of the American public and 10% of those with computers had Internet access in their homes,
much less a Web browser.90 By 2001, at least 53% of the population had home access, and 87%
of homes with personal computers were Internet–enabled.91 Of those without access, the most
important reasons for not connecting were reported in 2000 as lack of interest and cost.92
On the third point, we would expect novel uses and business models to appear some time
after the technology is first adopted. In the 1960s, computer use was the exclusive domain of
large corporations, the government, and academic institutions; the original ARPANet was thus
conceived to facilitate resource and information sharing among institutions.93 Evolutionary
developments in the computer industry made the Internet available as an information publishing
and retrieval tool for the public at large, not just institutional users. E–mail has also become more
than simply an electronic version of postal mail. Today, mailing lists and interactive Web sites,
(and “newsgroups,” which use different underlying protocols) are used, for example, to
coordinate collaborative projects, like open source software development94 or academic research,
95 and to support affinity groups for a whole variety of purposes (political, entertainment,
personal support, etc.) both locally and globally.96 (Though from personal experience, I would
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estimate that most people still use e–mail as a faster way of moving traditional individual and
business correspondence.)
Instant messaging (IM), which about half of online consumers use97 is another novel use of
the network; it is qualitatively different from both the telegraph and telephone. Exchanging
telegrams is like conventional postal correspondence, but instant messaging is more like a
conversation, since the reply is usually short and immediate. IM systems also enable a person to
engage in multiple conversations at once, including group chat. Far beyond the traditional private
“conference call,” one finds online thousands of public forums and discussion areas.
The economics of Internet data transportation are not terribly novel; customers have become
acclimated to flat rate and per–use subscription fees by the traditional telephone system. Retail
commerce is also reincarnated in the digital realm in a familiar fashion. Businesses set up web
pages to attract customers and generate orders, as if they were store fronts or mail–order
catalogs. But the traditional models for financing commercial broadcasting and publishing
operations — advertising and pay–for–access — have not done so well in “cyberspace.” The
sheer diversity of sites on the Web tends to spread audience attention more thinly than
conventional media, which decreases the amount of revenue available from selling ads. Pay–for–
access can be problematic given the danger that customers will make perfect digital copies of
their purchases for everyone else on the net. Both of these models also depend on customers
adopting new technology (which we have seen takes time and also depends on technical and
economic technique) and do not align with the initial non–commercial, everything–free culture
which the nascent Internet inspired, and to some degree still fosters.
The fourth and final point in the theory predicts that existing business interests should try to
resist changes which threaten their established profit–generating mechanisms. With the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and other recent law changes, the content industries have obtained
strong legal ammunition in an attempt to save the pay–for–access model. Traditional
broadcasters are currently engaged in several battle to defend their ability to control the
rebroadcast of their signals, and to extend their broadcasts into cyberspace on advantageous
terms.98
The projection of traditional legal and economic regimes into the digital realm is exactly
what the Technolibertarians are decrying with the accusation of “manufacturing scarcity.” They
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find particularly objectionable the carrying forward, expansion, and digital perfection of pay–
for–access model. The Internet is a valuable tool because it “frictionlessly” distributes
information, facilitating easy access and cross–fertilization. Denying access in the absence of
payment makes experimentation with or implementation of many alternative models — both of
economic support and of information flow and structure — more difficult, and in some sense,
“turns off” functionality that might otherwise be very important. Search engines cannot cheaply
index pay–per–view content. Copy–protected music might not be playable on a portable MP3
player if it was originally downloaded on a desktop computer. Obstruction of free access to
content diminishes the potential for future intellectual and cultural innovation and expression;
entrenched economic interests and laws engineered to protect them stifle economic innovation.
In any case, the pattern of history suggests that we are just beginning the process of
developing business models which can sustain content delivery in new digital media, and of
discovering novel uses for these technologies. The next chapter will examine in detail recent
legal, technological, economic, and cultural developments in the music entertainment industry. It
is a story of many struggles: old business interests vs. new, Technolibertarians vs. the law, and
Intellectual Property vs. Information Freedom.
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4 Case Study — Napster and Digital Music
Distribution
4.1 U.S. Copyright Law as It Applies to Music
Copyright law in the United States is, as Litman mentions,99 a morass of overlapping
provisions and esoteric exceptions. Before pondering how or if the law might be changed to
adapt to and guide further technological and social changes, it would be useful to have some
understanding of the intricate economic practices and compromises currently encoded in law.
This chapter briefly (to the degree possible with such a complex subject) summarizes these
arrangements, though this account is by no means authoritative or complete. Nor is it good legal
advice about what is and is not allowed; rather, it is an illustration of copyright tools in action.
In general outline, Congress has granted “intellectual property” rights (in this case, separate
rights for an underlying musical composition versus a recording of people singing and playing
that music) which allow the copyright owner to authorize (often in return for financial
compensation) many forms of copying, use in subsequent works, public performances, and
transmissions. Different rules apply to analog versus digital recordings, and transmission rights
are a morass unto themselves. There are also a number of cross–cutting general exceptions to
these property rights, the most important of which is called “fair use.”
4.1.1 Fair Use and Blanket Exemptions
Though it was created in American common law by the courts in 1841,100 the concept of fair
use was codified in statute by the Copyright Act of 1976.101 This is a broad exception which
allows consumers to take certain actions without permission of the copyright holder and without
paying royalties, even if other statutes make such requirements. This kind of loophole helps
protect a limited amount of public access to and use of copyrighted works which would
otherwise be closed or too expensive. Congress did not (and probably could not) rigidly define
the boundaries of fair use, but instead gave a set of criteria to the courts, by which they are to
decide such questions. These are as follows:
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.102
“Purpose and character,” means that for example, use or copying “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research” would weigh in favor of a ruling for fair use. The use or copying of a
large amount of material, or for commercial purposes (especially in competition with the
copyright holder) are strikes against the fair use defense. The “nature” of a work might refer to
its genre or the medium in which it was embodied, and to whether or not it was published. The
courts have established a number of precedents which provide guidance on how heavily to
weight each of the criteria, which I will not describe in detail here.
Some examples of fair use that would otherwise be prohibited by statue include: making use
making an extra copy of a CD to keep in the family car, using an excerpt from a song to illustrate
a point in an academic paper, or including video of people performing a copyrighted song to
document a public event in a newscast. Contrary to popular conception, some non–commercial
uses are prohibited, and some commercial uses are allowed. Likewise, not all short or properly
attributed excerpts are allowed, especially when used for commercial purposes.103 Other narrow
but cross–cutting exceptions are also granted by statue, but are not technically a part of the fair
use doctrine. These laws allow “public display and performance” in the classroom,104 creation of
a limited number of copies of certain kinds of works for certain purposes by libraries105 and for
the copying of audio books for the disabled, by non–profit organizations.106
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4.1.2 Creating and Publishing Music
After songwriters compose music, if they are interested in receiving royalties for use of their
works, they generally register the title with a so–called Performing Rights Organization (PRO),
in addition to the Copyright Office, though these are not strictly necessary. In the United States,
the music–related PROs are the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and SESAC, Inc.107 These organizations are given anti–
trust immunity in order that they may license performance rights on behalf of a large number of
composers. It would be a logistical nightmare to individually negotiate performance rights with
hundreds or thousands of artists as, say, a radio station might need to do. These organizations
provide a way to get performance permissions at a standard rate and on standard terms; they also
offer “blanket” licenses which cover all their respective member artists, useful for radio stations,
dance clubs, and similar users. These organizations process about one–third of the total royalties
paid every year to songwriters and publishers.108
Creating a “derivative work” — using a pre–existing work as the basis for a new creation,
whether through modification, excerpting, adaptation into a new medium, or compilation109 —
must always by done by permission of the copyright holder.110 “Borrowing” certain musical or
lyrical phrases might be permitted under fair use, especially if minimal and not for commercial
purposes. The printing of sheet music for works under copyright must also be done “by
permission,” usually arranged by contract. The loan, sale, rental, private display, and public
display “directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at
the place where the copy is located”111 of sheet music is permitted without the permission of the
copyright holder and the owner of the copy.112
4.1.3 Performing Musical Works
In order to legally and publicly “perform” a piece of music, permission must be negotiated
with the copyright holder directly,113 through one of the performing rights organizations, or
through the Harry Fox Agency.114 HFA is yet another private organization which is in the
business of licensing a variety of uses on behalf of a large number of artists.115 A “public
performance” is one “at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered” or which
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is accomplished by technological means to “members of the public.”116 Private performances are
always allowed without permission.
Special allowances for public performances include include: performance of religious works
or performance for religious purposes;117 no–charge and non–profit educational, religious, and
charitable performances;118 members–only performance for veterans and certain fraternal
organizations, with consideration for costs and purpose of performance,119 and performances in
record stores, or on musical instruments being offered for sale.120 “Performance” in these
special–interest cases does not include transmission to remote locations. There is no
conventional performance right in a musical recording, so as long as rights for the underlying
music have been secured (if needed), it is always legal to play a recording (aloud) without
permission.
4.1.4 Making Recordings
The first recording of a musical work must be arranged by permission; this is known as
securing “mechanical rights.” (Though this is obviously unnecessary if the recording artist(s)
also composed the music.) Subsequent recordings (known in the industry as “covers” if
performed by a different artist or group than the original) can be made under a “compulsory” or
“statutory” license.121 This means that the owner of the music and lyrics cannot refuse
permission, and the rate is set either by negotiation or at the industry–wide rate determined by
interested parties in a government–run copyright arbitration royalty panel, or CARP.122 (A
common technique, as we will see.)
Technically, the statutory license for the secondary “mechanicals” may be obtained through
the Copyright Office up to 30 days after the new recording is made,123 though the author of the
underlying work will not receive any royalties unless they are registered with the Office.124
However, permission may also be granted directly by the copyright holder or by an agent thereof
(with some restrictions on older contracts).125 The Harry Fox Agency offers a simpler alternative
to the Copyright Office procedure (for composers it represents, which are the vast majority) and
as a result handles 80% of such licenses.126 License requests for cover recordings at or below the
statutory rate127 may be processed over the Web.128 Notably, for smaller runs (less than 2500
copies), licenses may be obtained in a completely automated fashion, if paying by credit card.
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Most music is recorded under contract with a major record company, and this market is
remarkably concentrated. The companies of the Recording Industry Association of America
account for an estimated 85% of CD sales in the U.S.129 While the RIAA membership rolls boast
hundreds of “labels” (the company or subsidiary which actually has its name imprinted on the
recording)130 as members, in fact just five conglomerates dominate ownership of the market —
AOL Time Warner, Bertelsmann, EMI, Sony, and Vivendi Universal.131 As such, the contract
terms offered by these companies are to a large degree currently the controlling factor in how
recording artists are compensated for use of their works.
Examining a typical American compact disc recording, one will often find two distinct
copyright notices. One, denoted by the traditional (C) symbol, is for the underlying musical work
— the “sheet music,” if you will. The second is for the recording of that work, and is denoted
with a (P), for “phonograph.” Usually both of these copyrights are assigned by contract to the
same “label” that publishes the CD (especially if the performing artists also composed the music)
which in most cases is a subsidiary of one of the big five media conglomerates. (More on
ownership issues later.)
Unlike video tapes, audio recordings may not be rented without permission,132 but may be
lent (at no cost), sold, performed privately, and shown in public (remember that public “display”
means having the tape sit around where people can look at the outside of the physical object, as
opposed to “performance” which involves actually playing it) by permission of the owner of the
physical copy.133 (The protection that allowed free lending and sale of any copyrighted work is
known as the “first sale” doctrine — the copyright owner can only stop the first sale; re–sale of a
physical copy is always allowed by copyright.) Royalty rates for juke–box operators are set by
negotiation or in a government–run copyright arbitration royalty panel.134 In the case of
recordings of live musical events, the permission of the artists must be obtained before
“recording, transmission, sales, rental, or trafficking” in such materials is permitted.135
4.1.5 Transmission Rights
The property rights and exceptions surrounding transmission of audio recordings (and the
underlying lyrics and musical compositions) are some of the most complex in copyright law.
Here we find many fine distinctions which at first glance seem arbitrary, but from Litman136 we
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know are actually the product of intricate negotiations between parties with strong economic
interests in various pieces of the intellectual property pie.
As previously mentioned, the right to “publicly perform” — namely, to play in public, or to
broadcast — sound recordings is not reserved to the copyright holder, though the right to play
the the underlying compositions is.137 This means that only the permission of the composer(s) is
required for radio play (or broadcast to a crowded public square, for that matter) and also as
mentioned, the Performing Rights Organizations (BMI, ASCAP, SESAC, etc.) exist to facilitate
licensing of these activities. Common practice for commercial music radio stations is to simply
purchase blanket licenses from the PROs. Broadcast royalty rates for public broadcasters are set
by negotiation or through government arbitration.138
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA)139 changed this
arrangement for digital transmissions (but not digital copies). This new law (including
subsequent amendments) has created a complicated scheme which balances the economic
interests of companies in a number of related industries. In this scheme, ground–based, digital,
non–interactive radio broadcasts licensed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
are exempt from recording royalties, but they still must pay royalties to composers.140 Under
certain circumstances, rebroadcasts face some restrictions on the type of transmission and
distance from the originating station.141 This preserves the status quo, including the radio
industry’s freedom not to pay royalties to recording artists,142 but disproportionately regulates the
fledgling Internet music distribution industry.
Certain remaining classes of digital transmissions are subject to “compulsory” or “statutory”
licensing; royalties are paid to copyright owners in both the recording and the underlying musical
composition, and are once again set either by negotiation or a government–run arbitration panel.143
These transmissions must be non–interactive, in that the listener can choose a station, but cannot
choose what songs are played. Both pay and free Internet broadcasts qualify, as do digital
satellite and cable radio. In some cases, eligibility requirements for statutory licensing require
that playlists are not provided in advance, and that a defined number of works from the same
albums or artists are not played in a defined period. To the extent that doing so is technically and
economically feasible for the broadcaster, it is also required in some cases that copyright, title,
and artist information be transmitted to listeners; that the transmission not be easily recorded;
and that the user cannot scan a large number of channels to find a particular work (effectively
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choosing what songs to hear in an interactive fashion).144 By law, 50% of the royalties collected
for statutory licenses for sound recordings must be distributed to musicians; the other 50% goes
to the recording’s copyright holder, which might be the artist or his or her recording studio.145
Music played on interactive digital audio services must be licensed from both the music and
recording copyright holders. There is no compulsory licensing provision for interactive services,
but there are some restrictions on the exclusiveness of distribution agreements.146
For bands that “cover” previous recordings, the statutory license they may obtain for
performance of the underlying musical work also covers all digital transmissions.147 So, as long
as the appropriate royalties are paid, no additional licensing is necessary, and composers cannot
refuse permission for online broadcast of any legitimate cover recording.
As if all this weren’t complicated enough, for both analog and digital transmissions, there are
various exceptions (sometimes involving royalties negotiated though government–run
arbitration) which allow organizations entitled to transmit audio recordings to make internal
copies for technical reasons.148 There are also narrow transmission allowances made for
retransmission of both types of signal in hotels,149 food and retail establishments,150 educational
institutions,151 satellite transmission by statutory license,152 and other relatively neutral
circumstances.153 To handle collection and distribution of digital audio transmission royalties, the
RIAA companies, independent labels, and artist unions formed SoundExchange, a new sort of
Performing Rights Organization. It began dispersing payments to artists and record companies in
October, 2001.
Because of the relatively burdensome logistical task of monitoring almost every single public
musical performance of a copyrighted work, the older PROs use a mixture of census (complete
and exact enumeration of works played) and partial sampling (taking a survey of works played a
certain percentage of licensed users) techniques to determine how collected royalties should be
dispersed to owners.154 Because it deals exclusively with digital performances, SoundExchange
can reasonably request of its licensees a complete listing of all songs played. Considerably less
human intervention is required, because software to construct these listings automatically can be
installed relatively easily, especially for online media.
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4.1.6 Digital Audio Recordings
Like digital transmissions, digital recordings also receive very special treatment. The Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992155 gave consumers the right to make copies of any digital audio
recording for non–commercial purposes.156 This does not include, however, either video
recordings with audio,157 or recordings made by or for general–purpose computers.158 However,
all dedicated digital audio recording devices (which does not include general–purpose
computers, professional equipment, and spoken–word devices like answering machines159)
imported to, manufactured in, or distributed in the United States must include the “Serial Copy
Management System” or equivalent technology.160 SCMS allows original recordings to be
copied, but prevents the copying of copies. It also encodes all recordings with the globally
unique equipment ID number of the source, to make tracing pirated copies easier.161 The system
can, with some difficulty, be circumvented,162 but this is explicitly prohibited by law.163
To compensate for lost revenues from this now–legal consumer copying, all manufacturers
and importers of non–professional, dedicated digital audio equipment and digital audio recording
media must pay wholesale royalties to a central fund. The Librarian of Congress is charged with
distributing these revenues to copyright owners of the recording (2/3) and the music (1/3), with
certain percentages reserved for artists themselves (as opposed to the companies they may be
under contract with). The details of allocation are based on record sales and airplay.
4.1.7 Implications and Questions
After exploring this tremendously complex legal situation, a good next step is to examine
some basic economic realities that the law enables, and others which, in turn, shape it. We can
immediately see that this regime quite adequately addresses the practical need I identified in
section 2.3 — that artists be compensated for their work. Composers always receive royalties
from the publication of recordings, sheet music, and public performance of their works (except
for fair use). Sometimes these are paid directly, sometimes a standard license is granted by a
Performing Rights Organization or the Harry Fox Agency, and sometimes compensation is made
through the digital recording tax fund. Recording artists get royalties from record sales and
digital broadcasts, but not analog broadcasts, and from the digital recording tax fund. Consumers
are prevented by technological controls from making unlimited digital copies in the case of
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digital consumer audio equipment and digital broadcast services. In all other circumstances
(namely, the imperfect analog recording process) they face fines and imprisonment if they make
copies or otherwise share material in a manner not protected by either the fair use or first sale
doctrines.
As Litman claims (see section 2.2), entrenched economic interests have clearly made their
mark on copyright law. The big five RIAA companies already profit from their record sales,
from digital services, and from conventional radio play when the composer is also the recording
artist. The industry is insulated from competition with rental stores (rental is illegal without
copyright owner permission), though not from used music stores, which are protected by the
“first sale” doctrine. The record companies, by virtue of the new laws, have a competitive
advantage in cyberspace over other digital music distributors, and stand to profit even if they
cannot leverage that advantage successfully.
The fact that “webcasters” must pay royalties on both recordings and underlying music
benefits conventional radio stations, who only need make payments for the latter. Record labels
stand to profit by collecting royalty payments from webcasters, even if they do not enter the
online market themselves. Internet radio, if using statutory licensing, is also subject to playlist
restrictions (playing too many pieces from the same artist or album in a certain period of time)
which conventional radio is not. Interactive digital delivery services (including those that allow
permanent copies to be kept) are at an even bigger disadvantage, since they must have
permission from and negotiate for payment of royalties to both music and recording copyright
owners in advance.
On the other hand, the unique licensing requirements of “bitcasting” (especially the need to
negotiate for royalties with the major labels) have also made it more expensive for radio stations
to simulcast on the Internet. Hundreds of commercial stations have simply stopped bitcasting
their signals, or have been forced to apply technical solutions to remove advertisements. (A
dispute over whether additional payments were necessary for advertising performances was
settled in the favor of the artists.)164 Many low–budget college radio stations will also be unable
to afford to simulcast online because of the need to pay recording royalties.165
A frequent criticism of the current system of music distribution is that it favors a small
number of artists hand–picked by a small number of (corporate) industry participants. Indeed, the
ASCAP “sampling” procedure and royalty distribution scheme is clearly biased in favor of more
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popular artists.166 Moreover, the main vehicle by which consumers discover new music is
currently commercial broadcast radio.167 Especially with the demise of many non–aggregation
provisions with the Telecommunications Deregulation Act of 1996, ownership of the
broadcasting industry has fallen into a small number of corporate hands.168 It has also been
discovered (not surprisingly) that the more a given song is played on the radio, the more copies
are bought from record stores.169 Perhaps because the major record companies also have
significant indirect influence over what songs get played,170 a relatively small number of songs
remain in general circulation at any one time, and some consumers complain about overplayed
songs being “worn out.”171
Even though consumers are more likely to buy music they have heard on the radio, personal
taste also plays a large role.172 Clearly, some consumers would be better off if they were able to
chose from a wider variety of broadcast channels — they should, on average, be able to pick
something more attuned with their personal preferences, rather than something that represents
the “lowest common denominator” in the small number of genres served by their local radio
stations. New technologies — especially services which are able to collect some information
from the individual user — should also offer more sophisticated ways to discover interesting
music than simply picking a channel from a short, pre–defined list.
Without examining the actual goings–on in the marketplace in more detail, it is difficult to
say whether or not the current legal regime will enable such changes to take place, if they are
indeed better for consumers. There is also the question of how effective copyright laws actually
are in discouraging illicit copying, and whether or not overriding social goals (see section 2.3)
are met in practice. The next section looks at recent developments in the digital music industry
(underground and otherwise) with these questions in mind.
4.2 The MP3 Revolution
4.2.1 Early MP3 Technology and File Sharing
Compact discs store music in a digital format that is easy for personal computers equipped
with CD drives to access and store. However, this raw data takes up an inconveniently large
amount of space, over 10 megabytes (MB) per minute.173 MPEG–1 layer 3, commonly known as
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MP3, is a patented174 audio data compression format which reduces these storage requirements
by a factor of 10 with almost negligible loss in quality. A typical popular music track can thus be
stored in about 3–5 MB. Files of this size can be downloaded in about 7 to 12 minutes by 56kbps
modems (now common) or in less than a minute by faster but less prevalent “broadband”
devices.
A confluence of technologies — digital compact disc recordings, personal computers, CD
drives, hard drives capable of affordably storing hundreds or thousands of megabytes of data,
relatively fast Internet connections, file transfer protocols, search engines, and the MP3
compression algorithm — enabled a new phenomenon. Technically astute Internet users would
copy, or “rip” songs from CDs, compress or “encode” them in the MP3 format, and then
(illegally, as detailed in section 4.1) make them publicly available on the Internet. Typically,
however, the means of finding and accessing these files would be either time consuming, require
some amount of technical sophistication, or both.
For instance, it was common practice among “early adopters” of MP3 technology to post
files on an FTP or Web server. Dedicated search engines provided an indexing function for this
diaspora, but many servers would be offline, overloaded, or require the user to upload files
before downloading (a sort of quid pro quo), and this could make the search process quite
tedious. Moreover, using FTP in this manner requires slightly more technical sophistication than
most members of the general public possess, as did using Internet Relay Chat, a sort of instant
messaging protocol which has a facility for transferring files directly from user to user, called
Direct Client Copy. To make the process fit for popular consumption, an easier way to find and
download MP3s was needed. This is exactly what Napster provided.
4.2.2 The Napster Explosion
In its first incarnation, Napster175 was a “client” program that users would download to their
personal computers. It would connect to a set of central servers which functioned as a search
engine for the entire system. Users would then type in the name of the artist or song they wanted
to find, and then click through a list of copies they could download. Only files which were
currently available at the time of the search were listed, greatly simplifying the selection process.
The actual music files were not stored on the central servers, but rather on the personal
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computers of other users. The Napster client itself allowed those users to share their existing
MP3 collections, and handled the details of the file transfer, which proceeded directly from one
user’s computer to another, or in a “peer to peer” fashion. Only one person needed to “rip” a
song off of a CD in the first place; after that, copies could circulate in the Napster community
indefinitely, as long as at least one person was sharing a copy. Aside from the one–time MP3
encoding process, there was no loss of quality, because of the digital nature of the storage and
transmission medium.
Napster became a popular success at an astounding rate. In just 15 months, the number of
Napster users online at any one given time spiked from less than 100 in June 1999176 to an
average of 640,000 in September 2000.177 By December 2000, as many as 1.3 million people
were using the service at any one time, and there were more than 50 million registered users.178
This incredible trend resulted in a user base that rivaled the market share of America Online, the
world’s largest Internet Service Provider.179
This speedy growth seems to contradict the theory that large–scale adoption of new
technology takes decades. But consider that Napster was really just the last piece in a puzzle
which took decades to assemble and perfect. (And, of course, it was neither profitable nor legal.)
I have already discussed the slow popular adoption of Internet technology in general (see section
3.3), which itself was predicated on the creation and widespread adoption of cheap, reasonably
powerful personal computers, but now consider the history of digital music storage and sharing
technology.
CDs were first prototyped in the late 1970s and offered for sale the public in the early 1980s.
CD–ROM drives were introduced in 1985, making it possible for people to listen to CDs using
their PCs instead of a traditional stereo. By 1990, American household market penetration of the
compact disc was only 28%.180 This is relatively leisurely, considering that CDs are really
nothing more radical than an improvement on cassette tapes and LPs. Despite the format’s
improved quality, durability, and new “random access” features, it took time for people to invest
in the new equipment necessary to play the discs, even after it was wholeheartedly adopted by
music retailers.
On the transmission side of things, music has been shared over computer networks since the
days of pre–Internet services in the 1980s.181 The limits of storage, processor speed, and
bandwidth, however, meant that it was in the form of what is essentially electronic sheet music.
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Early PCs could only play back a few synthesized notes at a time, and display the lyrics and
some simple graphics. As the years passed, computers gained the capability to play recordings,
but practical sharing of high–fidelity music over the network was still impractical without higher
bandwidths and a good compression format. MP3 technology was actually developed and
patented in the late 1980s,182 but the first efficient playback software was not developed until
1997, by a student at the University of Zagreb in 1997.183 This was the leading edge of the World
Wide Web explosion.184 Two years later, and at least a decade and a half after the first music
sharing networks, Napster began its spectacular rise to fame.
Napster was thus the final refinement of a procedure which had been technically possible, if
inconvenient or expensive, for at least a decade and a half. Once the pieces were finally in place,
adoption was unusually rapid — but understandably so. Radios, TVs, PCs, Internet connections,
and CD players all cost money. Napster was free; it didn’t even require a trip to the store or a
phone call to an ISP, just a few clicks of the mouse and a little download time. Napster was most
quickly adopted in colleges and universities, where technical and cultural factors aligned to
prepare users for rapid uptake. Fast Internet connections and PCs were common, music listening
was a common hobby, communities were relatively well–equipped to spread news of this new
and easy to use technology, and most were happy to ignore the fact that some seemingly
unenforceable law was being violated.
I have previously cautioned (see section 3.3) that the process of adapting the content
distribution industry to the Internet is just beginning. Given that Napster failed to compensate
musical authors and recording artists for their works, its system seems neither sustainable nor
socially desirable. It seemed for a while to mark an unconditional victory against both
established interests (the powerful record companies) and proof positive of the unregulability of
Internet technology. But the slower–moving legal and economic powers–that–be — enforcing
the rules of Intellectual Property — soon presided over the destruction of this first incarnation of
Napster.
4.3 The Law Revisited: Digital Music Lawsuits
A slew of record companies, including both RIAA and independent labels, sued Napster for
aiding copyright infringement.185 A class action lawsuit was also filed by songwriters and music
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publishers.186 After an appeal to the federal Ninth Circuit, the lawsuits succeeded in bringing
about injunctions187 that forced Napster to exclude unauthorized copyrighted materials from its
service, based on lists provided by content owners. Napster began filtering MP3s based on file
names, then licensed technology that would actually examine the acoustic properties of the
recording to identify them. The number of files being shared fell through the floor, and users
flocked to alternative services.188 Eventually, the company chose to suspend service completely.189
Napster mounted a number of arguments in its legal defense, all of which failed.
4.3.1 Fair Use190
The Napster corporation argued that the primary uses of its service were fair uses, namely, as
it claimed: 1.) distribution of songs authorized by the copyright holder, 2.) sampling music
before buying, and 3.) downloading music one already owns on CD. The courts found against
Napster (or more precisely, its users) on all four fair use criteria (see subsection 4.1.1), for the
following reasons:
1. Purpose and character, whether use is commercial: File sharing adds no new
creative value to the works copied; Napster users “profited” from the service
by not having to buy CDs.
2. Nature: Music is a creative medium (as opposed to something factual or
political) and thus stronger protection was warranted.
3. Amount used: Napster facilitated wholesale copying, not limited excerpting.
4. Effect on market: Based on detailed consideration of competing expert
opinions and surveys, the courts concluded that music sharing on Napster
caused market harm by decreasing album sales among college students, and by
undermining the copyright owners’ ventures into the online music distribution
industry.
Of the three uses the Napster corporation claimed were legitimate, only the first — the
sharing of works as authorized by the copyright owners, which is legal irrespective of fair use —
was approved. With regard to the second use, the court incidentally discovered that other,
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licensed web sites that offered pre–purchase music sampling were much more restrictive. Users
there were restricted to short clips, could not make permanent copies, and the site owners paid
royalties to copyright owners. Napster had no permission to allow sampling, placed no
restrictions on its users, and did not pay any royalties. The third use — downloading music one
already owns — was termed “space–shifting” by its defenders, and has a more complicated
history.
4.3.2. Shifting in Space and Time
In the landmark 1984 Supreme Court case Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios et al.,191
which affirmed the VCR’s status as a legitimate commercial product, the judiciary concluded
that “time–shifting” — the personal recording of a television program for later viewing — was a
fair use. In 1999, the same appeals court hearing Napster made a similar ruling regarding the
Rio, a device that stored and played MP3 files, functioning not unlike a portable CD player. In
that case, RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia,192 the court ruled that “space–shifting” — making a
personal copy on a different device for use in a different location — was also a fair use. Two
years later, the Napster case resulted in a determination by the Ninth Circuit that offering copies
for download the world at large, which is what a Napster user does, is a fundamentally different
and unprotected activity. In both cases, the court determined that the systems in question —
Diamond’s portable MP3 player, and Napster’s file sharing network — did not meet the
definition of “digital audio recording devices” needed for protection under the blanket copying
exemption granted by the Audio Home Recording Act193 (see subsection 4.1.6).
This raises an important question for Internet users about the practice of downloading songs
they already own. One problematic aspect of Napster was that its users were not required to
prove that they already owned a legitimate copy of a song before downloading it. What if they
had been? In an unrelated lawsuit, another district court had ruled that this still would not have
been fair use.
The commercial website MP3.com once offered users the ability to access MP3 recordings
stored on its central server after demonstrating ownership of an existing copy. Users did this by
either buying a CD containing the recording from an online retailer affiliated with the site, or by
inserting the CD into their computer and having it “fingerprinted.” Once this process was
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complete, the user could listen to the centrally stored recording from anywhere on the Internet.
Various record companies sued, and in mid–2000, the courts determined that this was not a fair
use.194 The problem in this case was that MP3.com was essentially undermining the legally
constructed competitive advantage the copyright owners would have in the online music market,
and it was doing so by making use of their works without permission. The resultant damage to
potential economic rewards, the court said, preempts the “space–shifting” defense successfully
used in Diamond.
4.3.3. Liability as a Service Provider195
The copyright owners suing Napster had to prove not only that the system’s users were
violating the law, but also that its creators were liable for the community’s “direct infringement.”
Indirect liability under the theory of “contributory infringement” requires knowledge and
material contribution to the direct crime.
In Sony, the Supreme Court determined that VCR manufacturers were not liable for
contributory infringement because they had no specific knowledge of the infringement activities
of any of their individual customers. They of course knew that some consumers might misuse
their product, but they also knew that it was capable of “substantial non–infringing uses.”
The Napster founders, on the other hand, had posted pictures which prominently featured a
copy of the program displaying the system’s bounty of illegal downloads. They had clearly
witnessed specific instances of direct infringement. Moreover, it was technically and legally
feasible for them to intervene to stop the activity. It would be unreasonable to expect Sony to
send corporate inspectors into people’s homes to apprehend VCRs from owners who made
illegal copies, but it was feasible enough for Napster to alter their server software to suppress
certain file names, or to terminate repeat offenders. In fact, Napster had expressly reserved the
right to do so in its “terms of use” policy, but continually failed to intervene, even after it had
been served notice by copyright owners. The company also hoped to profit from the illegal
activity by indirect means. Collectively, these facts, the appeals court ruled, made it likely that
the plaintiffs would succeed in their case.
The courts did not determine whether Napster would be exempt from indirect infringement
liability under special exemptions granted by the DMCA to ISPs, search engines, and other
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online service providers meeting certain conditions. Given the history of the case, however, the
lower court that would have decided the rest of the case would have been unlikely to rule in its
favor on these issues.
4.4 Fallout
These lawsuits were not the end of the Napster company. It managed to settle the class action
lawsuit with songwriters, and partner with major and independent record labels as a commercial
online provider of their recordings.196 The new Napster uses a proprietary, secure file format
(called “.NAP”) to prevent unauthorized copying and uses (such as playing on portable devices);
it also charges for its service. Authorized, unrestricted files in the MP3 format will also be
carried.197 Napster’s affiliation with the music divisions of AOL Time Warner, Bertelsmann, and
EMI, and the independent Zomba, is through a partnership called MusicNet, a “platform for
digital music subscription services.” Various partners, including Napster, are allowed access to
the collective catalog, but set their own pricing policies and create their own user interfaces.
RealNetworks, the fifth partner in the venture, is already offering access through its “RealOne”
service. This includes streaming (listening without making a permanent copy) and downloadable
music, in addition to net–based radio and video offerings from a variety of non–MusicNet
partners, including Disney, News Corp., Sony Pictures, and Universal Music.198 Downloaded
RealAudio tracks expire at the end of each month.199 AOL has launched a test version of its
music service, which will reportedly allow the customers of the world’s largest ISP to download
or stream up to 100 songs each for $10 per month.200
PressPlay is a joint venture similar to MusicNet which includes the record catalogs of the
other two RIAA companies, Universal and Sony, as well as some independent labels. EMI, a
MusicNet partner, is also cross–licensing its music to the venture.201 It has partnered for
distribution with Microsoft (Windows Media is the preferred format, and MSN is a service
outlet), Yahoo!, Roxio, and MP3.com. The first three distribution partners have already launched
pilot services, and more providers are expected to come online in the future.202 Unlike users of
MusicNet–affiliated systems, PressPlay customers are able to burn songs to CD, though this is
subject to per–track permission by the owners, and the number is limited by the user’s service
plan.203 Downloaded songs can be accessed only as long as the user has a subscription with the
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service; the cost is currently $10 a month for 300 streamed songs and 30 downloads, or $25 for
1000 and 100, respectively.204
EMusic.com, owned by Vivendi Universal, has its own service with a small collection of
independent–label (though not necessarily obscure) artists, for which it offers unlimited and
unrestricted MP3 downloads for monthly flat fee comparable to its competitors. Independent
Listen.com offers unlimited streaming for $8 per month, but no downloads, and an even smaller
catalog. Vivendi Universal also now owns MP3.com,205 which currently offers users the
opportunity to sample, and in some cases buy (in CD and “streaming CD” form) music from a
variety of lesser–known artists.
Webnoize, a Cambridge, Mass. entertainment industry research firm, calls these sites
“Digital Music Aggregators.”206 Given the strong restrictions these services currently place on
users, their popularity in the long term remains to be determined. Many Technolibertarians207 and
others208 still (not surprisingly) prefer the free, unrestricted, and illegal file sharing alternatives to
paying for legitimate online music services or to buying conventional CDs at “bloated” prices.209
It is conceivable that the major labels will eventually learn what allowances consumers must
be given to justify the cost of the services. They might also cross–license all of their works to
each others’ services (as EMI has already done) to mutual benefit, creating something vaguely
resembling the ideal of a “celestial jukebox” — an online service that contains every piece of
music ever recorded. It remains to be seen to what degree independent artists will continue to be
included, and whether or not there will also be independent, innovative sites peddling the world’s
cumulative store of music. At least one bill has been introduced in Congress which would require
copyright owners to grant similar license terms to all interested online “aggregators,” which
would prevent independent vendors from being licensed out of the market.210 As of this writing,
the bill is still in committee; U.S. Department of Justice211 and European Union212 anti–trust
regulators have apparently hesitated over intervening in this nascent market, despite the high
concentration of ownership.
Wherever the market goes, it will take some time to settle out; perhaps most keenly aware of
this are the large, established interests. Reuters quoted Bob Pittman, AOL Time Warner’s co–
chief operating officer, as saying: “MusicNet is not something that’s going to change the
business overnight....We are realistic about what it is and what it is not.”213
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As far as free, unrestricted, illegal alternatives go, there are still plenty to chose from. One of
the most often–mentioned is Gnutella.214 Originally conceived by programmers employed by
AOL,215 this unwanted child was quickly adopted by the open source community. Now, no one
community or group of people is in charge of the system, and there are a number of client
programs, some developed by for–profit companies, others maintained by volunteers.
Unfortunately, the technology was never designed to support a massive flood of Napster
refugees, and so currently, a given search will only reach a fraction of the hosts actually on the
network.
The most popular216 unified system (as of October 2001) was created by a Scandinavian
company called Consumer Empowerment.217 The underlying file sharing technology, called
“FastTrack” is licensed to other development groups, who create the actual end–user
applications; the former currently include KaZaA (Netherlands/Australia),218 Music City
(Tennessee),219 and Grokster (West Indies).220 The international nature of product development
has not yet hindered legal action. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
succeeded in getting a Dutch court to order the shutdown of the KaZaA system221 and a slew of
movie studios, record companies are suing Grokster and Music City.222 It is unclear what level of
control these companies have over the software which has already been distributed to millions of
users, which they claim forms an autonomous network.223 If the technology is or becomes fully
independent of its creators, law enforcement agencies will have to shift their focus to individual
users who provide large amounts of content.
In the first half of 2001, the RIAA had 8,716 infringing online auctions terminated,224 and
sent an undisclosed number of “DMCA takedown notices” to Internet Service Providers,
including colleges and universities.225 The Motion Picture Association of America recently sent
hundreds of similar letters, targeting Gnutella users.226 The Act grants immunity to ISPs if they
promptly remove infringing material which their users have posted.227 With peer–to–peer
systems, this may mean disconnecting users from the network altogether, because the material is
not stored on ISP–controlled computers. This is a somewhat drastic measure;228 some ISPs
(including large providers like Verizon and EarthLink) have hesitated or refused to comply.
These intermediaries have conflicting motivations — they are understandably reluctant to
terminate paying customers, even though nearly all have strict policies prohibiting illegal
activities on their networks. On the other hand, since file sharing customers use a
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disproportionate amount of bandwidth, they may save on infrastructure costs by selectively
terminating infringing users. Perhaps the ultimate test of whether or not commercial ISPs (or
even educational institutions, which fill a similar role) will assist in copyright enforcement
actions is their resulting liability exposure. Consider the standard articulated in the Napster
injunction: actual knowledge of specific direct infringement, technical and legal feasibility of
intervention, and failure to act. After receiving a “takedown notice,” an ISP with an infringing
customer would seem to meet all three criteria if it did not promptly terminate service — if a
crime were actually being committed.229
In section 2.4, I mentioned the enforcement evasion strategy of seeking offshore data havens.
In the music realm, the Canadian group Fairtunes is attempting to raise funds to run a Napster–
like service in the sovereign and copyright–free Principality of Sealand, and incorporating a
holding corporation in a third country with an equally lax legal structure.230 This seems both
expensive and prone to failure, given the power copyright–enforcing countries might choose to
exercise over mainland Internet Service Providers and other intermediaries. Even if the scheme
succeeded, it would merely shift the focus of enforcement from the operators to the system’s
domestic users, which is the same problem posed by fully decentralized and autonomous systems
(which Napster was not).
I also mentioned in that section that digital technologies can make it significantly easier to
detect and intercept individual copyright violators. A company called Ranger Online, for
example, is marketing an automated tool for scanning the Internet for infringing works,
informing copyright owners, and generating the appropriate legal paperwork.231 A competitor
named Copyright Control Services aims to make this process self–sustaining, by offering
offenders the opportunity to settle out–of–court for $3,000–$5,000, which is presumably
considerably more attractive than fighting a losing court battle against a large and well–funded
company, and end up paying $100,000 in statutory damages.232 It is unclear whether or not
content owners would risk the political and economic backlash that widespread application of
these techniques might cause, but the potential to exploit them does exist.
If they do proceed, users may choose to limit their exposure to the risk of legal action by
sharing files only with trusted friends (or trusted strangers). Another “peer–to–peer” system
called Aimster (whose creators are also being sued) has successfully demonstrated this concept.
This sort of fragmentation, however, obviously reduces the number of files on the system
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available to any given person. (And really, this level of “acquaintance” copying is not much
greater than that permitted under the Audio Home Recording Act with dedicated digital audio
hardware; see subsection 4.1.6.)
The ultimate solution for users seeking a free and unrestricted service would be a distributed
file sharing system that was publicly accessible and provided strong anonymity for both
publishers and consumers. These are precisely the design goals of the Freenet Project,233
originally conceived by Ian Clarke, a former student at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland.
The network is also designed to be resilient to forced closure of many nodes, and to prevent
participants from knowing what files are being stored in the local hard drive space that they
donate. This gives litigious copyright owners no central organization to sue, and makes it
difficult to accuse any given node holder of contributory infringement, since the system works
hard to ensure they have no “specific knowledge” of any such activity. If Freenet is implemented
correctly, it would also be extremely difficult for law enforcement officers to link illicit files with
the people who are uploading or downloading them. In Freenet, even a single request generates a
series of new copies throughout the network, potentially crossing through multiple legal
jurisdictions.
Freenet was founded on the principle of absolute freedom of speech and with the goal of
preventing any and all forms of censorship. Ian Clarke’s philosophy understands enforcement of
intellectual property rights as a form of censorship, and declares it utterly incompatible with the
concept of free speech.234 So far, the system has not been widely adopted, most likely because
completion of the technical infrastructure is proceeding slowly, and because it currently requires
moderate technical expertise to install and use successfully. There are at least two projects (Espra
and Snarfzilla) building user–friendly interfaces for the system, both providing electronic means
to donate funds directly to artists.235 Neither has seen much progress in the past few months.
Perhaps if consumers are driven from the more popular peer–to–peer systems, or if other, related
needs arise, people will have more of a need for strong anonymity in their lives, and more
attention will be given to these projects.
The implications of a move to a strongly anonymous system would shift the problem yet
again, in one of three ways. One strategy the legal system might use would be to “defang” the
system, by making it illegal to run software providing strongly anonymous file sharing
capabilities, or without copyright protection safeguards built in. If you think this seems horribly
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intrusive and potentially unworkable, you are not alone. A second option would be to accept the
system and find a completely different way to finance the music industry; not likely, given the
business interests of powerful corporations would be at stake. A more plausible outcome would
be for the content producers to “bottle up” new releases more tightly so that they never make it
onto the system in the first place. Distributing music in a more secure medium to begin with
actually reduces the necessity of cracking down on file sharing in general — at least for new
content. The Universal Music Group has already announced plans236 to incorporate copy
protection in all of its future releases.
Enabling copy protection features in the compact disc, a medium which was never designed
with such capabilities in mind, is a difficult task. By slightly altering the way in which data is
encoded, the present goal is to prevent CD drives connected to PCs from being able to read the
discs, while still allowing conventional consumer devices to play them normally. Because of the
latter constraint, it is not difficult for the technologically astute to compensate for the encoding
changes237 and continue to “rip” tracks and encode them into MP3 files which can be shared on
the Internet. To assuage consumer complaints238 that this kind of copy protection prevents people
from legally playing CDs on their computers, Universal has included software on the discs that
allow the protected tracks to be played on Windows–based computers, but not to be copied.239
This does not, however, address unhappy owners of portable MP3 players and non–Windows–
based computers, who cannot use these protected discs in convenient ways which remain
perfectly legal.
It would be considerably safer for the industry to publish its music in a truly secure format.
DVD–Audio players can play conventional CDs, but their native format is encrypted, making
them an obvious candidate. Unfortunately, moving consumers to this new format would require
them to invest (once again) in a new playback technology. They will be slow to do so, given their
satisfaction with CDs (despite the longer playing time of DVD–Audio discs), the installed base
of CD players and availability of discs in that format, and the increased expense of contemporary
DVD–Audio players. (And DVD copy protection has its own problems, as chapter 5 will reveal.)
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4.5 Artists, Contracts, and Innovative Discovery Technology
The recording companies are joined in their alarm at the proliferation of online file sharing
by many musicians.240 These businesses, though, shore up profitability not only by clamping
down on piracy, but also by minimizing the compensation they pay to artists and songwriters. As
I have previously mentioned (see subsection 4.1.4) the RIAA companies control 85% of the
record sales market, and their music dominates broadcast radio, the primary vehicle of
promotion. If a band wants to publicize its music to a wide audience, its best option is arguably
to sign a contract with a major record label. Unfortunately, due to their market dominance, these
companies have considerable leverage in negotiation, and end up reserving for themselves the
vast majority of any eventual profits.241 Artists, well–known or not, get very little in return for
their creative efforts, relatively speaking. The quite famous (and major label–signed) recording
artist Courtney Love put it this way:
Since I’ve basically been giving my music away for free under the old system,
I’m not afraid of wireless, MP3 files or any of the other threats to my copyrights.
Anything that makes my music more available to more people is great.242
While Love is trying to extract herself from her recording contracts, the lesser known, but
reasonably successful243 artist Jim Infantino and his band have avoided signing themselves into
“indentured servitude” with a major label; Jim has this to say about online distribution:
I am a big supporter of the FREE and UNHINDERED distribution of music on
the web. As much as the owner of a club has the right to have a jukebox playing
in his establishment we feel that everyone has the right to trade mp3s on the web
NON–COMMERCIALLY. I hope that some day sites like Napster will pay dues
to ASCAP and BMI — so that the songwriter will get the money owed to them
for helping these web based companies generate money. But I will be very very
clear that I do not feel that under any circumstances are RECORD COMPANIES
entitled to money from web–based applications for trading music. They should be
thankful that the music is being traded and people are getting interested in a bands
back catalog for NO–EXPENSE (unlike the expense of radio promotion)....They
have been ripping off the artists who have made them money for 40 years and
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now they get upset that they can’t make the few extra bucks from the Internet?
Screw that.244
Digital distribution methods are a boon for the vast majority of artists who would never
become well–known under the current system, either because they are rejected by the major
labels245 or because they are under–promoted. These artists are also under–recognized by the
sampling techniques used by Performing Rights Organizations in analog media, especially in
genres more popular in media other than radio (see subsection 4.1.7). Love remarks:
How can anyone defend the current system when it fails to deliver music to so
many potential fans?...The status quo gives us a boring culture. In a society of
over 300 million people, only 30 new artists a year sell a million records.246
The reason radio is such a useful medium for promotion of new or undiscovered music is that
it mixes familiar and (presumably) well–liked music with novel acts, in a way large numbers of
people can easily access in the course of their daily lives. It can be difficult to accomplish this
through other conventional means of self–promotion: playing concerts, perhaps as an opening
act, or by sample giveaways at music festivals or record stores. These methods can be expensive
and time–consuming, though they are more likely to connect esoteric acts with fans that might
enjoy them — certainly more so than broadcast radio. Fortunately, new technologies are
providing opportunities for artists to connect with fans in far less expensive, and potentially far
more personalized ways.
Even new broadcast media, like satellite radio, make hundreds of channels available to a
given location, rather than the ten or twenty found in the conventional broadcast spectrum.247
With Internet radio, essentially anyone who choses to become a webcaster can be heard by
anyone who choses to listen. Online broadcasting already encompasses thousands of stations,
including simulcasts of conventional broadcasters from around the world248 and a few million
listeners.249 With these new capabilities, many little–known bands should find themselves on
someone’s playlist next to similar more popular acts. Listeners tuning into a station that caters
more closely to their personal tastes than their local conventional radio stations are more likely to
discover these acts serendipitously.
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Bands can (and have)250 also set up web sites, or even webcasts, themselves, to promote their
music, though drawing attention to a stand–alone site is a challenge unto itself. A better solution
is to upload sample tracks (or entire repertoires) to an “aggregation” site, like MP3.com, EMusic.
com, Vitaminic.com or the Internet Underground Music Archive (iuma.com) (or maybe even a
MusicNet or PressPlay affiliate). Users can search collections of obscure music by genre; in
some circumstances, these services even pay dividends to artists.251 Successful bands can also
sell CDs over the Internet, either with a major retailer like Amazon.com, or with an independent
site.
Some users may enjoy spending hours and hours browsing through online music catalogs,
looking for quality music they actually like, perhaps trying genres with high concentrations of
music they already own. But most people would rather start with music that many other people
have listened to and also liked, or music that has been recommended to them based on their
personal tastes. After all, people have been getting music advice from acquaintances and friendly
store clerks for decades. Innovative digital systems have already been created which attempt to
integrate automated but personal recommendations with the convenience of a radio broadcast or
a personal music collection.
The MIT Media Laboratory and its failed FireFly technology pioneered what is known as
“collaborative filtering” — recommending a new song based on the fact that other people (whose
other preferences overlap substantially with the customer) also like the same song or set of
songs.252 More successful systems include Amazon.com’s famous collaborative recommendation
engine (which is based on previous customer’s buying patterns) and MSN Music’s radio station
recommendations, based on mood or favorite artist. More sophisticated automatic techniques
often include audio analysis techniques which attempt to quantify each track in dimensions like
tempo, pseudo–mood, sub–genre, and other fuzzy metrics, in order to improve the quality of
recommendations. Lesser known systems that make recommendations based on the user’s
personal MP3 collection include the Relatable253 technology inside the free MP3 software player
FreeAmp, the moodLogic player254, and the KaZaA plug–in for the WinAmp MP3 player.255
(Relatable is affiliated with both EMusic.com and Napster, the latter of which has also acquired
the venerable collaborative music search engine Gigabeat.)256
Merging artificial and natural intelligence, Media Unbound combines collaborative filtering,
sound analysis, and input from music experts with some initial input from the user to literally
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create a personalized “radio station.” Salon’s Janelle Brown, who tried a demo of the system,
said the playlist created for her was “perfect,” including bands she knew that “perfectly
epitomized my rock tastes” as well as “obscure bands I had never heard of before, but which I
discovered that I liked....In just half an hour, Media Unbound managed to convince me to
investigate 10 new bands that I never would have heard on the radio.”257 Musicmatch.com now
sells a similar service.258 Garageband.com is another “digital music aggregator” that has
constructed a business model around collaborative filtering, though it does not provide personal
recommendations. It invites recording artists to use its site for self–promotion, including MP3
sampling, announcements about live performances, and CD sales. Web surfers are offered free
pickings from most of the site’s CDs in return for reviewing samples of music they have likely
never heard before.259 The results of these ratings are compiled into rankings; top artists are
offered a relatively conventional record company contract with the operators of the site.260
Garageband presents its music in such a way that listeners can download MP3s of the songs they
hear, skip songs they don’t like, and learn more about the bands they are listening to. This system
provides a vehicle for obscure bands to gain notoriety, reduces costs and risk for the record
company, and gives a means for consumers to discover new music that their fellow listeners (as
opposed to record company executives or radio DJs) have “pre–approved.”
On a crude level, the trend toward customization in online music mirrors the shift from
broadcast to cable services in the television industry. In fact, MusicNet’s president and CEO,
Alan McGlade, helped pioneer an innovative music video cable channel called The Box. It
allowed viewers to phone in and request their favorite videos; customers in different areas would
see different selections based on the requests of their neighbors.261 Digital video distribution is
the subject of the next chapter.
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5 In Comparison — Digital Video Distribution
The digital video distribution industry has not experienced much that compares with the
dramatic rise and fall of Napster, and general online consumer participation in this industry
remains low. Historically, motion picture technology has had less time to accrue complicated
legal regulations, and has proven more difficult to adapt for the Internet age. This chapter takes a
similar approach to the last one, starting with a legal primer, and then exploring the struggle to
popularize innovative technologies and find sustainable business models.
5.1 U.S. Copyright Law as It Applies to Motion Pictures
In the abstract, copyright laws concerning video, or “motion pictures” as the statutes refer to
the technology, is substantially similar to audio–related regulation. Permission of the copyright
owner is required to copy video footage, or to make use of it in a subsequent work in a way not
allowed by fair use. There are still the cross–cutting exceptions for fair use, classroom use,
libraries and creation of special versions for the blind. (See section 4.1.1.) “Special interest”
provisions, such as those for religious and veterans groups in audio rights, have not accrued in
motion picture law.
Unlike audio recordings, all public performances of motion pictures, including the display of
individual frames, require permission,262 and rental is allowed without permission.263 Embedding
an audio work in an audiovisual one — using a song in a movie, for instance — is considered to
be making a “derivative work,” so permission of copyright owner of the music is required. The
Harry Fox Agency acts as an intermediary for this type of license.264 Just as there are laws which
deal separately with terrestrial, cable, and satellite radio, for example, a number of statues codify
specific practices and rights (including limited copying and rebroadcasting privileges) in the
terrestrial broadcast television, cable television, and satellite television industries.265 There are no
statutory licenses, except for public broadcasting266 and satellite rebroadcasts.267
5.2 Practical Considerations
The reason moving picture technology has been difficult to adapt for the Internet age, as I
claimed at the outset of the chapter, is primarily a problem of bandwidth. MPEG compression
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standards (of which the MP3 format is one) exist for video signals, but the amount of
information they must encode is fundamentally much greater. Typical MPEG–encoded, TV–
quality video segments take up about about 36 MB for each minute.268 At this rate, a four–minute
music video (144MB) would take almost 6 hours to download on a 56Kbps modem, and about
34 minutes on a 560Kbps broadband connection. A two–hour feature film (4.3GB) would
download in 171 hours over the modem, and 17 hours over the broadband connection. Equally
important, a relatively fast PC (meaning relatively recent and probably not inexpensive) is
required to render video at anything near TV quality; audio playback is considerably less
computationally intensive. 95% of American Internet–using consumer are still using dialup
modem services,269 and many of these disconnect from the Internet when they are not actively
using network services, often because they use a household phone line for access. Because of
these bandwidth limitations, downloading any video whatsoever for dialup users requires
extraordinary patience, severely reduced picture quality, or both, if it is feasible at all.
A fairly wide variety of VHS and DVD–compatible movies are available for rental at the
typical American corner video store, so people need not turn to the Internet for instant
gratification when a craving for eye candy strikes. Far fewer, if any, audio recordings are
available for rental. Though it is tempting to pin this on the fact that copyright holder permission
is needed for audio rental, that law270 was passed in 1984 — most likely after the trend had
already taken hold. Perhaps psychological and personal economic factors are actually more
important; that is, it is not so much an impediment to profitable supply, but a fundamental lack of
demand. It makes sense, for example, that most people would typically only want to see a given
movie once, unless they are avid collectors, overly wealthy, or it happens to be one of their
favorites. But people typically listen to music over and over again while they are doing
something else, or when they are in a certain mood. There are also other supply–side problems
unrelated to the legal situation. For example, it may be the case that because audio rentals would
almost certainly have to be even cheaper than videos, “brick and mortar” merchants would not be
able to make enough money to pay for their fixed costs (like rent and staff). Perhaps most
importantly, it is very easy (and legal, under some circumstances) for customers to make
reasonably good (if not perfect digital) copies of the rented music at home, which gives suppliers
a strong incentive to sell rather than rent. Unlike CDs, it is very difficult for the average
consumer to digitally copy DVDs, the new digital movie format, and all VCRs are now legally
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required to scramble DVD input.271 The problem with digital copying is not just the need for
new, more expensive DVD drives and a very large hard drive connected to a PC, but also the
built–in copy protection in the format (more on this later in the chapter).
In the online world, ongoing fixed costs are lower, and copy–protection schemes can
drastically lower the incidence of unauthorized home copying of rented material. The medium is
also considerably more amenable to casual home listening. Based on consideration of these
factors, it is not surprising that MusicNet and PressPlay services essentially offer online “rental,”
for less than a nickel a song. But remember that the relatively bandwidth–limited Internet
distribution channel not only competes with rented and purchased DVDs, but also new
technologies like interactive television (distributed by cable and satellite) and Digital Video
Recorders, or DVRs. To put this industry in the context of the theory of change offered in
chapter 3, consider Figures 5.1 and 5.2, which compare market penetration of various delivery
technologies, including theater attendance.
Year 1980 1990 2000
Televisions >99% >99% 98%
VCRs 2% 70% 86%
DVD Players – – 15% (est.)
DVRs – – <1%
Cable TV 18% 55% 69%
Satellite TV – ? 10%
Computers ? 22% 66%
Internet – 2% 54%
Broadband Internet – – 5%
Figure 5.1: Fraction of American households
with certain content delivery technologies.272
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Frequency of Attendance Fraction of Population
Never 26%
Infrequent 10%
Occasional 34%
Frequent 30%
74%
Figure 5.2: Frequency of American movie theater
attendance in 2000 (self–reported).273
5.3 Studios, Indies, and the Internet
The most traditional of these media are dominated by the seven corporations of the board of
the Motion Picture Association of America. In many ways, these mirror the five companies of
the Recording Industry Association of America, and in some cases the owners are one and the
same. AOL Time Warner, Disney, Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, News Corporation (which owns
Twentieth Century Fox), Sony, Viacom (which owns Paramount), and Vivendi Universal each
operate several movie studios, which together account for about half of all theatrical releases in
the United States274 (compared to RIAA’s 85% market share).
In 2000, the average MPAA feature film cost about $28 million to produce and another $27
million was spent on publicity. That’s about twice the 1990 average, and almost six times the
average cost of a major motion picture in 1980.275 Independent films financed out–of–pocket
typically cost ten to twenty thousand dollars, perhaps a few hundred thousand or a million with
financing from a small studio.276 Digital cameras, PCs capable of high resolution editing, and
digital projectors have in recent years made possible significantly reduced setup, filming,
distribution, and projection costs. New filmmaking technologies have also freed directors from
some of the constraints of bulky conventional equipment, and made simple post–production
tools, like color changes and lighting effects, accessible to the low–budget filmmaker.277 Even
major studios might soon take the digital plunge; if theaters invest in new cameras and
projectors, the industry could save save perhaps $300–$900 million per year in copying and
distribution costs,278 and prevent the degradation in quality that reel–to–reel prints suffer as they
are shown over and over again.279 Currently, only about 10% of the films which are
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independently produced each year enter theatrical release; the rest are relatively unavailable to
the general public.280
The Internet represents a new, more “democratic” distribution channel, and a number of sites
have sprouted up to aggregate freely downloadable (and legally posted) independent films.
“Shorts” are especially popular; they are cheaper to produce, faster to download, and don’t
require a large time investment. Independent digital video aggregation sites include Hollywood.
com,281 dScoop.com, The Bit Screen,282 the sync,283 and microcinema.284 These sites are supported
by advertising, cross–promotion, provision of content to other services, festival showings, or by
enthusiastic hobbyists. The non–profit Internet Archive,285 which is supported by philanthropic
donations, exhibits historic video ephemera to the public, among other services. IFILM,286 which
is affiliated with Yahoo! Movies287 and is partly owned by Sony, uses its site as a screening tool
for new talent; submissions provide content for its other sites and partnered subscription services.
Using a more traditional commercial model, sightsound.com offers medium–quality “rental
downloads” of its independent features for a fee. Finally, once again paralleling the recording
industry, six of the seven MPAA members have split into two groups, which are in the process of
launching competing subscription–based, video–on–demand websites.288 AOL Time Warner,
MGM, and Viacom/Paramount will participate in Sony’s MovieFly;289 Disney and News Corp.
plan to launch their service on Disney–owned Movies.com.290
If this trend continues, what will it do to the industry? The cynical argument is that big record
companies and movie studios are only providing artists financing, in return for a large share of
the profits, ownership, and potentially a good deal of creative control. Pauline Kael, in a famous
New Yorker piece291 ties the profit motive to problems meeting the social goals of quality,
diversity, and creative freedom. In order to avoid risk, she says, established industry players tend
to fall back on a strategy of formulaic plots, sequels, superstars, and lots of marketing hype,
usually skirting excessive experimentation or originality.
To the extent that this might be true, alternative exhibition methods could circumvent the
major studios and allow people (especially those outside cities with successful independent
theaters) to experience a more diverse set of film shorts and features. Hundred–million–dollar
budgets, though, pay for armies of animation and computer graphics artists and engineers,
spectacular sets, wardrobes, special effects, superstar salaries, stunts, crowd and battle scenes,
and other popular features of Hollywood’s synthetic reality. It is arguably beneficial for both
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big–budget and independent filmmaking to co–exist, which, except for certain inequities in
public exposure, they currently do.
Despite the potential of the Internet to remedy the publicity problem, even broadband
technologies are insufficient to the task of providing high–quality video fast enough to woo
American consumers away from their televisions and rented videos. Existing higher bandwidth
delivery systems, however — including broadcast television, cable, and satellite — can be
retrofitted with interactive capabilities. Unless there is a shockingly fast and unanticipated
deployment of ultra–high bandwidth connectivity in this country, it is the potential for adaptation
of older media that will likely have the biggest effect on consumers in the next few years.
5.4 Video on Demand
Cable television wires already carry dozens of uncompressed, TV–quality video streams into
our homes, so it’s no surprise that they can be repurposed for Internet broadband, a service which
typically requires far less capacity. This conversion is accomplished by exchanging the passive
conduits of the cable company’s distribution backbone for an active Internet backbone with
enough capacity to deliver packets to and from all the customers connected to a local loop. A
small box in the home — the cable modem — talks to this new backbone over the existing lines,
which are potentially also still delivering cable TV.
The same technique can be used to introduce interactive video services. Instead of shuffling
Internet data, digital cable set–top boxes, routers, and dedicated company–side servers can be
used to provide a service known as “Video on Demand” or “VOD.” Essentially, all this means is
that instead of tuning in at a particular time to watch a movie, customers can select the
presentation of their choice through an interactive menu. From there, the set–top box works like
a VCR, with pause, rewind, fast forward, and other familiar features. This is really not all that
different from playing a video stream from a remote web server; VOD just uses dedicated cable
lines and slightly different transmission and display technologies.
AOL Time Warner, owner of both the country’s second largest cable television company
(Time Warner Cable)292 and the subscription channels HBO and Cinemax,293 has been
experimenting with VOD. “HBO On Demand” is currently available to digital cable subscribers
in five American cities, who can remotely access a weekly selection of the channel’s movies
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using a VCR–like interface, for a flat monthly fee.294 In conventional pay–per–view services, the
viewer phones in to a central office, which then sends a signal to the individual set–top box
telling it to de–scramble the appropriate channel at the appointed time. “On demand” services
actually cause playback from the remote server to begin as soon as the user requests it. Time
Warner Cable also offers “instant movie rentals” to some of its customers, in a sort of hybrid
pay–per–view/on–demand service called “iControl.”295 Other cable companies have begun to
offer similar services, for instance, Starz On Demand,296 available to Adelphia cable customers in
Cleveland, Ohio, and Comcast customers in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania.297
5.5 Digital Video Recorders and Broadcast Television
If Video on Demand has the potential to preempt Internet video, Digital Video Recorder
(DVR) technology has the potential to beat VOD to the punch. DVRs like the TiVo, SonicBlue’s
ReplayTV, and Microsoft’s UltimateTV are in many ways like VCRs — they are set–top boxes
that sit at the receiving end of broadcast, cable, and satellite signals, and consumers program
them to record various programs. Instead of using cassette tapes, programs are recorded on
conventional hard drives.
In one sense, hard drive technology is qualitatively very different from magnetic tape. But
both have been around for a long time. Hard drive video storage may well prove to be a
“disruptive” product, in the sense of Christensen;298 the differential evolutionary changes both
technologies have undergone have resulted in a situation where digital storage may displace
magnetic tapes in consumer electronics. In the case of DVRs, one technology in being swapped
out in favor of another one which has a different technical ancestry. Most of the functionality
provided is the same, but what might be considered evolutionary feature–set innovations may
lead to revolutionary changes in the pattern of consumer use. All of this hinges on exactly what it
is that people do with this kind of technology in the first place.
The three main uses people generally have for VCRs is to temporarily record programs they
wish to view later (the “time–shifting” affirmed as fair use in the Sony decision), to permanently
archive important or well–liked video, and to view pre–recorded material. DVRs, when used in
combination with conventional VCRs and DVD players, still allow archiving and renting. What
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they change is the ease of temporary recording, and in turn, how viewers might typically
experience broadcast television.
Because the removable analog tapes of a VCR are replaced with a built–in digital hard drive
and on–screen menus in the DVR, the hassles of buying tapes, figuring which ones are safe to
record on, finding the desired tape in a pile of poorly labeled ones, and fast forwarding and
rewinding to find the start of a program, are all eliminated. On–screen menus, fed by program
listings provided by the service operator (sometimes for a monthly fee), streamline the process of
selecting in advance which programs to record by eliminating the translation of paper listings
into instructions for the VCR concerning the appropriate time and channel to record. (The VCR
Plus system is one existing technology which uses special code numbers in printed listings to
make programming easier, but it does not provide many of the other benefits of DVRs.)
In addition to simplifying time–shifting, new functionality is also enabled by the updated
infrastructure. For example, DVRs have the capability to record programs associated in the
provided listings with a particular word or phrase, to adapt to changes in program schedules, to
record showings of a favorite program that the user did not anticipate, and to automatically
record programs suggested by a personalized “recommendation engine” similar to those
employed in the digital audio industry. Novel features like “pausing” live broadcasts, “instant
replay,” and automatic, on–the–fly commercial deletion are made possible because hard drives
can read and write different segments of the same program simultaneously. People who use
DVRs are much more likely to watch pre–recorded content than people who use VCRs for
several reasons. Many barriers to doing so have been eliminated, more features become available
when they do, and there is a certain convenience in not planning the rest of one’s life around the
television schedule.
The technology provides essentially the same functionality as video on demand, but currently
features much greater selection of programming, wider availability, and greater consumer
control. This provides strong competition for VOD on both cost (though buying a DVR is an
investment of several hundred dollars) and functionality. If DVRs become as popular as VCRs
(remember Figure 5.1) they may also threaten the viability of advertising–supported broadcast
television. If large numbers of people watch broadcasts on a short delay, or at another time
altogether, they will likely skip commercials. The ReplayTV can even delete them automatically,
in advance.299 Broadcast television is profitable only because large numbers of people are
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exposed to the commercials; if a significant fraction of the population is no longer seeing them,
this will seriously reduce their value as measured in dollars. On the other hand, because the
device records economically valuable information about personal viewing habits and
preferences, it creates entirely new markets. TiVo, for instance, exploits the information it
collects about the programs its subscribers watch and enjoy, and which commercial they skip,
though it does not correlate these with customer contact information.300
DVRs may also make it somewhat easier to make unauthorized (but potentially legal) copies
of broadcast video. For example, there is an active hacker community which has developed the
ability to extract program recordings from the TiVo.301 The ReplayTV 4000 has the unusual
capability to share recorded television programs over the Internet with other users (presumably
friends and family) who have compatible models.302 (Major television networks filed suit over
this particular feature, as well as automatic commercial–deletion functionality, but dropped their
complaints, most likely concluding that the courts would either declare these fair uses, or find
that SONICblue was not liable for what infringement might be taking place.)303 The ReplayTV
also requires a broadband connection, which positions SONICblue to become a Video On
Demand provider, but over the slower Internet, rather than over cable lines. (On the other hand,
if the DVR automatically time–shifts downloaded programming anyway, connection speed is
less of an issue.) If commercial–supported broadcasting becomes less profitable, the result could
be a shift toward subscription–based systems of all kinds. An additional hazard is the slated
conversion of all U.S. television broadcasting to a digital format. The content industry companies
are attempting to form a consensus around various schemes that would prevent consumers from
making unlimited perfect copies of these broadcasts, but it is unclear how successful they will
be.304
Broadcast television is still very much with us today, however, and the entrenched interests
there have been fending off competition from new distribution channels for low–fidelity versions
of their signals. For example, recordTV.com, which allowed consumers to use the site’s servers
to record television signals and view them at a later time, was shut down after an MPAA lawsuit.
305 The Canadian site iCraveTV.com, which re–broadcast live television signals over the Internet,
was also forced to discontinue service after an American federal court injunction prevented it
from “leaking” these signals back into the United States.306 JumpTV now intents to offer a
similar service, and like iCraveTV, it claims to be legal under Canadian law as long as royalties
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are paid to a central fund. Unlike the previous venture, JumpTV intends to implement strong
technological restrictions to prevent American viewers from accessing the site; it intends to
support itself through advertising.307 The MPAA is interested in blocking services like these
because broadcasters can presumably get higher advertising rates if they “target” their signals to
particular regions, rather than, say, Internet viewers in general. Movie studios would, in turn,
suffer lower royalty payments as a result. Persistent copies of broadcast shows — which would
not carry “fresh” advertisements — are yet another concern.
5.6 DVDs and Anti–Circumvention
The movie studios also protect profits by separating customers into targeted groups. DVD
“region codes” divide the world up into several zones; a player designed to work in one region
will not play discs designated for a different one. Anime fans who buy DVDs from Japan (Zone
2) will not be able to play them on conforming American (Zone 1) boxes. Studios sell theater and
retail distribution rights to different countries separately, and prefer to release new films in
stages. So Australian (Zone 4) movie fans may want to raid Amazon.com for DVDs of films that
have not yet made their theatrical debut Down Under, but would be unable to view them with
locally manufactured players that respect these lockouts.308 This practice has attracted the
attention of both the European Commission309 and the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission.310
These annoyances can be easily circumvented by devices which ignore the region codes, but
in the United States, this is now illegal. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act prohibits the
circumvention of any “technological measure” that controls access to any copyrighted work.311 It
also made it a crime to sell or otherwise provide anyone else with any technology or service that
is primarily promoting, designed, or used for the purpose of such circumvention.312 This is a very
strong piece of legislation that gives a powerful legal tool to publishers who use technological
“self help” to prevent unauthorized access or copying. Unfortunately, it also prevents users who
might have legitimate reasons for doing so — for example, to make backup copies, or to unlock
a public–domain work — from having the necessary tools and (for getting access in the first
place) the legal right to do so. The law does grant certain narrow exceptions for libraries and
educational institutions, reverse engineering to achieve technical interoperability, and encryption
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research, but the scope of these exceptions, as well as the appropriateness of the anti–
circumvention law in general, is currently the subject of heated court battles.
A given DVD, at the discretion of the producer, may have up to seven different systems (not
counting region codes) which, in concert with playback equipment, attempts to thwart
unauthorized copying. However, many of these schemes require the cooperation of the playback
equipment.313 Given a DVD–ROM drive, a PC, and some technical sophistication, all of these
systems may be easily circumvented, except one — the Content Scrambling System. CSS is
essentially a system of encryption; the keys necessary for decryption are supposed to be secrets
kept by the hardware chips of licensed DVD players. There are no licensed software or hardware
players for many computer operating systems, so Linux users, for instance, cannot play even
legally rented or purchased DVDs on their computers. At least, they could not until CSS was
cracked in 1999;314 various “DeCSS” programs that unlock the encryption have been available on
the Internet ever since. Technolibertarians are fond of emphasizing that these systems can be
used to achieve “interoperability” with non–mainstream operating systems, but DeCSS tools can
also be used to make pirated copies of DVDs playable.315
Among other litigation,316 the MPAA sued 2600 (a Technolibertarian hacker’s magazine and
online publication) and various other individuals and organizations for violating the DMCA by
posting copies of DeCSS on their web sites. The federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
a permanent injunction against posting copies, or even linking to other web sites that post copies.
317 The court ruled that because the anti–circumvention provisions are “content–neutral,” serve a
“compelling government interest,” are “narrowly tailored,” and target the functional aspects of
the software (rather than its expressive aspects) they are not invalidated by the Constitutional
protection of free speech.
Technolibertarians the world over have mainly ignored this decision, and have taken up
posting and reposting DeCSS code as acts of civil disobedience. One college professor has
posted an entire gallery of DeCSS links, in an effort to illustrate the speech–like nature of
computer code.318 Others have repeatedly emphasized that the DMCA is being used as a tool to
effectively — by taking certain technologies away from the public — deny people the ability to
make certain “fair uses” as they would otherwise be entitled. These campaigns are unlikely to
affect judicial opinion on such matters, which will likely continue to uphold Congress’ authority
71
to regulate technology in this way (though as of this writing, the Supreme Court has yet to
examine the issue).
5.7 DirecTV’s Victory in the Technical Arms Race
Whether or not the anti–circumvention provisions survive the test of further judicial review
and future public scrutiny, they do currently represent a major victory for the Intellectual
Property camp and the strong propertization of information — at least in theory. You may at this
point have the impression that while content–based corporations may prevail in court, they are
vastly outgunned in the matter of practical enforcement. I have already mentioned third–party
“bounty hunter” agencies that in theory, could step in and round up scofflaws. But let me leave
you with one last example showing that at least one company (albeit one that had the benefit of
special hardware) did possess the will, financing, and technical expertise to win at least one
battle in this hacking war.
DirecTV equips its satellite receivers with special computer chips which are designed to
decrypt only the channels that the owner of a given receiver is authorized to view. Enterprising
hackers found a way to re–write the on–board software in these chips in such a way that they
could view all the channels, whether or not they had paid for them. The company could send
software updates via its broadcast signal; it occasionally used this capability to change the
encryption scheme it used and thus render the hacked chips useless. However, the hackers would
merely re–program their devices, and continue to receive free satellite TV. On January 20, 2001,
DirecTV completed an ingenious series of rapid–fire changes to their software. Hackers applied
their own code changes to compensate, and in so doing, an estimated 98% of them triggered the
built–in self–destruct feature, which physically destroyed their altered cards. The DirecTV team
signaled its victory by electronically writing the words “GAME OVER” in the first eight bytes of
the devices’ memory.319
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6 Analysis and Projections
6.1 Social Goals and Systems
In section 2.3, I outlined some broad social goals concerning the creation of intellectual
content. Now, with the benefit of the intervening case histories, allow me to re–iterate these
goals in greater detail, rearranged into the following three groups:
Compensation
– Creators are compensated for their work, creating an incentive and improving
their ability to constantly produce more and better material.
– The amount of compensation is “fair”; in other words, it reflects the actual costs
of creation in both materials and human attention, plus the social utility of
creating content rather than something else.
– Allocation is determined democratically, giving artists an incentive to create
works which will be popular.
– Collection of compensation puts minimal friction on the creation of new works
and the advancement of science, technology politics, art, and culture.
Diversity
– Producers retain creative freedom, giving them the opportunity to create
potentially controversial or contemporarily unpopular works of high quality or
importance.
– Content produced does not solely cater to what is most popular; a wide diversity
of preferences (and hence producers) are represented.
– There are one or more successful means of publicizing the full diversity of
works to interested parties.
Innovation
– New technology which improves how content is discovered, delivered, enjoyed,
used, and paid for should not be suppressed or impeded, but supported.
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I have described a number of technologies (various means of Internet–based distribution,
collaborative filtering, digital cameras and editing, etc.) which reduce the costs of production,
dissemination, and discovery. These free up more money for artists themselves, and both directly
and indirectly enable a greater diversity of content to reach the people most interested in
receiving it. I also mentioned a few self–interested behaviors which have become norms in
certain communities. For example, many college students are perfectly willing to download
content off the Internet without paying the people who created it.
I have not yet attempted to explore certain other, harder to understand cultural and
psychological effects. For instance, some people simply enjoy creating things like music,
pictures, movies, or other art forms, and will do so even if there are no material rewards. The
Internet is strewn with sites created by people who post information or creative works as part of
a hobby. Some online services are provided by people who have personal causes, who like the
idea of helping other people in some way, or who enjoy the recognition and gratitude that
follows. Some people do give money rather selflessly to public broadcasting or their local
symphony orchestra or theater group, even if they could personally receive the same services at
lower or no cost. These kinds of behavior may complicate theoretical economics, but they also
suggest new funding mechanisms for intellectual content.
6.2 Economic Models
On the subject of compensation, the case studies in chapter 3 unearthed a number of relevant
economic models. I have combined these with a number of other schemes, and roughly divided
them into four groups: voluntary contributions, propertization, profiteering, and public funding.
6.2.1 Voluntary Contributions
Many content creators, especially artists and musicians, don’t make enough money from their
work to support themselves. Many of them have “day jobs” and play music, make amateur
movies, write books, hack on software, or post things to the web in their spare time and on their
own dime. A great deal of the available content on the web now is created by hobbyists, and
though as a whole it may be unorganized, this does not mean that one cannot find useful and
entertaining320 information. For example, in preparing the motion picture case study, I have
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personally relied on the DVD FAQ321 (a FAQ is a list of “Frequently Asked Questions” and
corresponding answers), part of the collection of Usenet FAQs,322 all created by volunteers.
Other prominent information–gathering efforts include DMOZ,323 an Open, human–edited web
directory, and several Open Encyclopedia efforts.324
All of this activity in the absence of financial compensation underscores tends to validate the
application of the tools of Information Freedom. The GNU Foundation proudly points to a 1987
Boston Globe article which summarizes psychological evidence that when it comes to creative
endeavors, “intrinsic” rewards, or self–motivation, produce higher–quality work than “extrinsic”
rewards, such as monetary compensation or approval of an authority–figure.325 The Free/Open
Source software community certainly has its fair share of part–time volunteers, but not always
for entirely altruistic or intrinsic reasons — not to mention the fact that a considerable amount of
development effort is put in by companies seeking to benefit financially from their contribution
in some way.326
Moreover, while the “labor of love” approach might work for relatively low–budget creative
endeavors like music, mutually beneficial projects like software, or the independently wealthy
(and their benefactors) it does not work well at all for other purposes. For instance, scientific
research, professional journalism, and big–budget film–making would all be severely curtailed
without the funding for full–time staffing and expenses like laboratory equipment, travel, and
special effects.
In any case, expecting creative people to bear all of the burden of supporting themselves, in
addition to donating their time and energy to their work, seems unfair. It’s an accepted notion
that when we encounter a musician, magician, or comedian on the street, if we stop and enjoy the
performance, we should contribute something to the pile of cash which generally accumulates
inside a hat, jar, or instrument case. This may not fit well with a rational economic analysis based
on assumed self–interest,327 but it is what people do.
Well–known projects which benefit from both volunteerism and donated funds include the
Free Software Foundation328 and Project Gutenberg, which posts electronic copies of public–
domain books on the Web.329 In combination with the wide availability of credit cards, so–called
“micro–payment” systems like PayPal330 and the Amazon Honor System331 help make it
convenient and economical to donate small amounts of money to worthy endeavors providing
free content on the Web.
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Adopt A Band.com332 is a volunteer effort that has collected over $4,000 in PayPal donations
for the artists it hosts.333 Fairtunes is an even more ambitious effort that seeks to repay artists
whose works have been downloaded over the Internet without payment, or indeed, any worthy
content creator. Its system is actually integrated into two popular (software) MP3 players,
WinAmp (with download of a plug–in) and FreeAmp.334 It has collected over $19,000 in 17
months of operation.
Soliciting donations is a tricky business, appealing to a sense of virtue as it does. People may
be considerably less likely to donate if they are sitting alone in front of their computers than if
they are in the middle of a crowd of people who are donating money in plain view of the artist.
Despite the success of “peer–to–peer” music sharing systems like Napster and its successors,
Fairtunes has generated a negligible amount of revenue compared to the typical CD sales of the
artists it supports, including independents. It would certainly help if the service were better
placed, better integrated, easier to use, and considerably better publicized. But the lack of
overwhelming response is probably a commentary on whatever cultural currents have fostered
the current acceptance (in certain circles) of rebellion against the music industry. People who
“steal” popular music electronically often say they would be willing to pay for the same content,
if only the terms were reasonable; the deals being offered by MusicNet and PressPlay, in the
current climate, do not seem reasonable. Perhaps some people assume that artists who have
chosen to post MP3s of their music up on the web must somehow be supporting themselves;
more likely, they don’t really give the matter much thought at all, unless prompted. Whatever the
reason, suggesting to artists that they live off of purely spontaneous donations does not seem to
be a sustainable proposition.
While our capitalistic society is unlikely to convert to a “gift economy”335 in the foreseeable
future, voluntary contributions can at least partially support expensive endeavors, if properly
solicited. The public broadcasting industry, for instance, relies on individual donations for 26%,
foundations for 6%, and business donations for 14.7% of its funding (though arguably the latter
is a form of advertising).336 Notably, only roughly 10% of public radio listeners actually
contribute funds.337 How does this work? Compared to say, Fairtunes, broadcasters enjoy large
audiences, produce a product popular among their listeners, occasionally directly nag their
listeners about contributing, and can express legitimate concern about decreasing levels of
service if the money doesn’t keep rolling in. It is possible to implement contribution “reminders”
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in software, as well, though both Intellectual Property and pure Free/Open Source models have
been more successful in that industry than the “nagware” idea.
All in all, the biggest problem with any voluntary contribution model seems to be lack of
effectiveness in generating funds. Cultural changes, more attention to the psychological factors
governing contribution, or better general economic prosperity might make these some of these
systems viable on their own, but unless a wealthy patron steps forward, supplementary sources of
income are almost always needed.
6.2.2 Propertization
The opposite of a voluntary contribution model is essentially full propertization. Intellectual
Property rights are usually used to grant access only to those consumers who pay for the
privilege, except that some portion is may be made freely available for promotional purposes.
This is by far the dominant model in all intellectual content industries, from movies to books;
even some online newspapers.338
A few years ago, the most common fear about the coming digital age was that online services
would increasingly be billed on a pay–per–use basis, because more fine–grained billing and
access controls were becoming technically and economically feasible. If history is any
indication, however, consumers will prefer flat–rate pricing, and it will be more profitable for
providers to give it to them.339 Another theory was that ISPs might offer “all you can eat”
portions of enhanced content to their users, in order to give themselves a competitive advantage
over others who would be merely providing access to the free (as in money) Internet. This has
happened to some degree; a quick tour of the “portal” pages for the large ISPs such as AOL,
MSN, EarthLink, Prodigy, and Gateway,340 reveals a plethora of commissioned, strategically
placed, and sometimes restricted–access content. Particularly concerning for the social goal of
diversity in available content is the direct merger of ISPs with content–producing companies.
The merger of AOL and Time Warner, for instance, warranted a consent decree with the Federal
Trade Commission, in which the new company indicated that it would not engage in
discriminatory conduct with regard to competing content.341 Also notice that Microsoft, owner of
MSN, populates its portal with news headlines from its joint venture, MSNBC.
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Corporate consolidation has already negatively impacted both the diversity and of offerings
in the music and movie industries, and the democratic allocation of compensation, as outlined in
chapter 3, and as suggested by others.342 Strong Intellectual Property rights are also inherently
detrimental to the creation of new works and the advancement of science, technology politics,
art, and culture. The requirement to tender payment before access is granted introduces a
disincentive to draw from the experience of a large number of existing works, especially among
the economically disadvantaged. Creativity may also be stifled because permission is usually
required before using an existing work as part of a new one, or by improving it.343 In practice,
strong propertization arguably results in the under–compensation of the majority of artists and
the overcompensation of “inefficient” corporate intermediaries.
The case study in chapter 4 suggests that market forces (involving both consumers and
artists), enabled by new technology, may improve diversity, reduce interference from
intermediaries, and increase direct–to–artist compensation in the music industry. This may also
happen to a lesser degree in the independent motion picture business, where equipment and
production costs are usually much higher, and the inadequacy of Internet bandwidth retards these
changes.
6.2.3 Indirect Profiteering
Through the Free/Open Source movement, the software industry has evinced the most
dramatic partial adoption of the Information Freedom paradigm, with corresponding benefits for
innovation and diversity, but concerns over compensation. There are certainly some inherent
benefits to participating in distributed software projects. For instance, a given company or
institution (or even an individual) may use an Open Source product to solve an internal problem,
perhaps with community assistance. If those modifications are shared openly, the contributor will
automatically receive the benefit of future improvements made by others, building on the new
functionality.
Other means of obtaining funding for a project indirectly are also possible. Red Hat Software
is a commercial distributor of the Linux operating system, which it, among others, makes
available for free download. The company, which is just now beginning to become profitable,
makes money by providing end–user support (and incidentally, instruction manuals and pre–
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loaded CDs), custom software solutions, and consulting services to paying customers.344 It is
successful at doing so largely because of the publicity and proof of technical expertise it gains
from the popular Linux distribution it gives away to many people for free. Google and AskMe345
use similar “tech demo” strategies. Garageband.com is a reasonable parallel in the “creative
content” world; it makes money by signing recording contracts with the most successful bands
on its site.
Cross–promotion of physical merchandise is another indirect money–making scheme. For
example, a free web site might be used to promote sales of CDs or books, or boost attendance at
concerts, screenings, or exhibitions. Selling advertising is a tried–and–true method of generating
indirect revenue, but it does not provide sustainable income if consumer attention is divided
among too many publishers. Newspapers and broadcast media currently rely heavily on this
model, but it seems to be supporting fewer and fewer web sites.
6.2.4 Public Funding
The federal government already directly funds a number of content–based industries through
a number of entities, including the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the National
Endowment for the Arts, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the
Department of Defense, the national laboratories, and local colleges and universities. The biggest
danger of using public money to support research, news, music, plays, exhibitions, and other
related activities, is the threat of political encroachment on creative and expressive freedom,
through the selective (or threatened) reduction of funding. Another concern is whether or not the
government will consistently provide a prudent level of funding, given other budgetary concerns.
The details of precisely how funding is awarded are in many ways removed from the
legislative process and distributed among professionals in the appropriate fields. Broadcast
producers pick what stories run on the news; university faculty by and large choose what to
research, how to go about it, and select and edit articles for academic journals. Political whimsy
becomes more problematic when it comes to coarser measures of control, like cutting overall
funding or eliminating agencies altogether.
The introduction of digital distribution technology, with its reduction in publication costs, has
increased accessibility to audio archives of news broadcasts and spoken–word cultural
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programming, like those of National Public Radio. It is also making possible the free (for the
consumer) exhibition of vast amounts of information. For instance, the University of
Pennsylvania has collected a listing of over 15,000 books available online, most of them hosted
at publicly funded institutions.346 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has announced a
project to make course materials for virtually all of its classes available for free online.347
Meanwhile, a fierce debate348 has been raging about the funding and availability of academic
journals online. Instead of the traditional pay–for–access scheme, the new model would require
publishing institutions, which are usually substantially supported by public funds, to bear the
costs. Academics would still have incentives to support journals and to provide articles because
decisions about institutional tenure and funding require active publication and acceptance by
reputable peers. The system of peer review would obviously need to adapt so that articles could
continue to be properly certified, and that would take time and institutional change. The point of
making this change would be to put academic research results to better practical use in society at
large, to speed further innovation by removing barriers to being well–informed, and to open
access to economically disadvantaged individuals and organizations, especially in remote areas.
The growing digital collections of public libraries are another important trend. Many online
journals and research collections are access–restricted, but university and other local libraries
often have “site licenses” which enable members of the public who are physically present in the
library (or who are online and properly authenticated as card holders) to have unlimited access.349
So even in a heavily propertized regime, the economically disadvantaged might still gain
adequate access to research and entertainment resources through publicly funded institutions, if
those institutions are properly provisioned and maintained.
By far the most democratic model for public funding of creative expression (despite the
vexing assumption of some350 that public funding is completely and inherently dictatorial) is that
provided by the Audio Home Recording Act. A directed tax on consumer audio recording
equipment provides the funding; DJs and (paying) consumers allocate funding though decisions
about what to play on the radio and what to buy in the store. Lawrence Lessig, among others, has
suggested that this model be extended to all digital music downloads, including Napster–like
systems.351 Revenue could be generated by a tax on MP3 players, Internet access, and audio–
capable computers, or in a more capitalistic alternative, by systems that generate profits through
indirect means, which pay statutory royalties. Rewards might be allocated according to
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popularity measurements taken by privacy–respecting software installed at central locations or
on home computers, and audited by a neutral party. Revenue rates could even be adjusted from
year to year based on the measured strength of consumer demand for new music.
6.3 Proposals for Legal Change
“Distorting the law and the technology of human communication and computing,
in order to protect the interests of copyright holders, makes the world poorer
overall.”
— John Gilmore, Electronic Frontier Foundation.352
Lessig’s proposal is not the only one which seeks to facilitate competition in the online music
industry. In August, 2001, Congressional Representatives Chris Cannon of Utah and Rick
Boucher of Virginia formally proposed a bill called the Music Online Competition Act. The Act
would prevent major record companies from cross–licensing their catalogs only to each other; all
copyright owners would have to offer equal licensing terms to all distributors, including
independents. The measure, though it might help make available a more diverse set of music, and
increase competition in the industry, is obviously unfavorable to the major labels, and so faces
strong resistance from that quarter.
As the title might imply, Lessig’s The Future of Ideas is primarily concerned with the
detrimental effect of over–regulation and over–propertization on innovation. In the case studies
of chapters 4 and 5, I described a number of new devices and new use–patterns, like portable
MP3 players, DVRs, and collaborative filtering. In her own book, Litman cites a number of
historical examples where innovation and improvement was spurred because property rights
were not reserved to the copyright holder, creating, in Lessig’s terms, a partially “unowned”
resource:
“Player piano rolls became ubiquitous after courts ruled that they did not infringe
the copyright in the underlying musical compositions; phonograph records
superseded both piano rolls and sheet music with the aid of the compulsory
license for mechanical reproductions; the jukebox industry arose to take
advantage of the copyright exemption accorded to ‘the reproduction or rendition
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of a musical composition by or upon coin–operated machines.’ Composers
continued to write music and found ways to exploit these new media for their
works. The videotape rental business swept the nation shielded from copyright
liability by the first sale doctrine. The motion picture industry predicted that if
Congress failed to rush in to correct the problems posed by the invention and
marketing of the videocassette recorder, American television would be slowly
destroyed, and American motion picture production would sustain grave injury....
Notwithstanding all the gloom and doom, however, both the motion picture and
television industries discovered that the videocassette recorder generated new
markets for prerecorded versions of their material. Cable television began
spreading across America with the aid of a copyright exemption; it eclipsed
broadcast television while sheltered by the cable compulsory license. Yet, there is
no dearth of television programming...353
One of the largest copyright–related barriers to building on or innovating with existing
works,354 aside from the expansive scope of propertization, is the duration of protection.
Copyright for new works lasts for life of the author plus 70 years, or 95 years for corporate–
owned works. Financial benefits which accrue only after the death of the author clearly have
questionable influence on the “incentive to create.” Most of the value found in intellectual
property holdings is usually extracted in the first decade after publication.355 For instance, the
typical feature film will accumulate three–quarters of its eventual revenue in the first 14 months
after its release.356 Rare exceptions include “classic” works which endure in popularity for many
years; though arguably, there is much more social value in de–propertizing these than allowing
their owners to retain tight control.
In the closing pages of Ideas,357 Lessig offers a laundry list of improvements to copyright law
which seek to address the harms of over–propertization, without diluting the relatively strong
rewards for creators. This list includes the following copyright–related provisions:
– Grant copyright in five–year renewable terms, up to the current limit, for
published works.
– Require registration before copyright protection is granted.
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– Use the Copyright Office web site to facilitate registration and renewal.
– Charge registration and renewal fees so that property rights are retained only if
there is considerable value in doing so.
– Software source code to be escrowed with the Library of Congress.
– Grant current protections to unpublished works.
– Grant tax benefits for the donation of existing works (which would keep their
current protections) to the public domain.
– Only enforce the anti–circumvention statues if the protective technology in
question “provides for fair use.”
– Grant compulsory license terms for works which are not being commercially
exploited by their owners.
Patent reform is also at the top of his legislative agenda — and rightly so, especially in the
fast–innovating online world — though I have not explored why in this thesis. Finally, he argues
for allowing, as a defense against accusations of copyright infringement, the fact that a new use
does not harm existing markets. For instance, in the MP3.com case, customers had the choice of
either using the company’s service to listen online to music they already owned, or to manually
transfer their own collections. In either case, they would still have to buy a CD in the
conventional manner, so the existing market for recordings could only be helped by the service.
But MP3.com was profiting from a service that the copyright owners might choose to offer
themselves — though they had not done so — and thus was depriving them of potential revenue.
This tipped the balance of fair use against MP3.com; Lessig’s defense would help companies
like it prevail against non–innovative entrenched interests in the future.
6.4 Projections and Conclusions
In Digital Copyright Jessica Litman offers an even more radical solution to the same
problem: a wholesale re–write of Title 17. Litman would change the “copy right” into an “exploit
right” — all non–commercial uses would be allowed, unless they created “large–scale
interference” with the owner’s potential of commercial exploitation.358 (She also proposes
creating various consumer and author rights, including making temporary copies in order to read,
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citation, access to works in the public domain, and truthful labeling in adaptations.) This would
upset the intricate set of compromises currently enshrined in the statutes, but would arguably
both re–align the law with popular values and make the law much, much easier to understand.
For better or worse, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act passed Congress with near
unanimity. Unless unforeseen events intervene to change the political situation, the content
industries will continue to maintain their long–standing influence over Congress in these matters,
and the law will not change in any way that substantially threatens their interests. Nor is the
government at all likely to adopt the extreme Security Systems Standards and Certification Act
(SSSCA),359 which would require embedded copyright compliance mechanisms in all computers
and electronic equipment. It would not only be costly and quite controversial, but it is opposed
by equally powerful business interests.
The domains of business and technology, on the other hand, are more fluid. Various
economic models, both legal and otherwise, are being experimented with. The technical “arms
race” continues between hackers and protective content owners.360 Legal content distribution
systems may prevail in these contests, either because they offer the services that consumers want,
or because people find it easier to pay up than to “pirate,” even if strong anonymity is available
in systems like Freenet. On the other hand, there may always be some level of illegal copying,
and consequently perhaps some amount of enforcement action. If my predictions about the music
and motion picture industries hold, a diversity of independent artists could well flourish there in
the near future, and consumer may see find interesting content available at lower prices.
On the other hand, we have already seen an increase in the use of “self–help” —
technological barriers to unauthorized copying and access. Consumer reaction to these systems
and the ability and interest of hackers to technically circumvent them (and not get caught) will
primarily determine how much protection is cost–effective. It is unclear as of yet which
industries might tolerate significant amounts of unauthorized copying but remain profitable (like
the software industry has for many years) and which might crack down harder or bottle up
tighter, at the risk of alienating customers.
Consumers do hold the power of the purse over content–producing corporations, but
selective abstinence seems to be an unpopular approach. One Slashdot community member
responded to the suggestion that boycott “is the is the only lawful, moral and ethical way to
cause them financial harm”361 with the following post:
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“Considering that the MPAA/RIAA doesn’t listen to reason (look at the 2600
suit), we can’t bribe them (they’re already rich), we can’t threaten them with legal
action (they can afford lawyers, we can’t), what other form of persuasion is left to
us besides theft?”362
“rjh” then went on to advocate selective theft of only copy–protected movies, providing a
measured and somewhat civil message to the movie studios to change their ways. Hardly anyone,
it seems, is actually heeding this advice, nor does it apply very well to the music industry. The
vast majority of content carried by file sharing systems on the contemporary Net are illegal
copies of popular CDs, hardly any of which are copy–protected in the first place. The trading of
movies online is, as I have explored in detail in chapter 5, much more inconvenient.
The civil disobedience of Technolibertarians, perhaps aided (intentionally or otherwise) by
the casual and perhaps not unjustified disregard for copyright law many Americans seem to
share, is a way of forcing the issue of whether or not a legal regime that favors “self–help” is an
acceptable alternative for copyright owners. As Litman points out, if enough people ignore the
law, at some point, it may become necessary to find a new set of rules that more people find
acceptable.363 This might mean that the sort of changes suggested by Lessig and Litman might
one day become politically feasible. But it might also make more conceivable the adoption of
stronger enforcement methods, like those proposed in the SSSCA. Lessig considers civil
disobedience “risky and increasingly costly,” and worries that it reinforces the philosophy of
Intellectual Property. He writes on Slashdot:
“Copyright hoarders demand increasingly extreme rights so that they may
exercise almost perfect control over how their content gets used. In response, the
civil disobedience movement sends a message that they should have no control
over how their content gets used at all. Between perfect control and no control,
most would choose perfect control. And hence, we lose.”364
I won’t speculate either way on the issue, but I will reiterate that there are perfectly legal
ways that average people can influence the changes our society is experiencing. People can
educate themselves about the many content offerings already available to them, and then decide
whether they want their money supporting the established interests and the status quo, or
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something different. They can boycott companies that don’t give them what they want, and they
can, if enough people actually take the time and energy to do so, put real pressure on elected
officials to improve the law to better serve the public interest. Artists, programmers,
businesspeople, and investors, can choose what kinds of technologies, business models, and
creative content to support with their skills and attention. People can compensate substantially
for the social inadequacies of the current heavily propertized regime by supporting their local
public libraries with individual and public resources.
In closing, I hope that academics, professionals, journalists, programmers, and citizens will
find the techniques and facts I have collected here useful in achieving a more nuanced and
holistic understanding of the forces which mediate social and technological change. It will also
be interesting for me personally to see whether or not history will continue to unfold as I expect
it will, and to apply the insights I have gained through this project to related problems.
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A Note on Sources
Many of the sources I cite are on the World Wide Web. A special concern for electronic
sources is that they may disappear without warning. However, one of the projects I mention, the
Internet Archive, has engaged in the ambitious task of maintaining a permanent copy of every
web page their crawler can access. You may find their site, at <http://www.archive.org> to be
helpful in digging up intact copies of downed web pages.
For those of you not familiar with legal citations, the notation “USC” refers to the United
States Code. The preceding number refers to the title (for my purposes, always Title 17, which is
the main collection of copyright statues) and the following numbers refer to sections and
subsections. (I have ignored chapters and subparts, in order to remain sane.) As of February,
2002, you can find the U.S. Code online at <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/>. The U.S.
Copyright Office provides a more concise summary of copyright laws, regulations, and other
matters at <http://www.loc.gov/copyright/>. I am less familiar with case law citations, but many
recent decisions, including almost all of those I reference, are also available online. I have found
that the best general starting place for locating many types of legal documents is FindLaw <http:
//www.findlaw.com>.
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